# English
Translation
> Translated
on May 08, 2025
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A Legal Study on
the Independence of the Bank of Lebanon and the Necessity of Maintaining the Homogeneity
of Banking Legislation
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A Legal Study on
the Independence of the Bank of Lebanon and the Necessity
of Maintaining the Homogeneity of Banking Legislation
This study was
prepared with the aim of clarifying the principle of independence inherent to
the Bank of Lebanon in accordance with the systems and provisions established
in the basic law known as the Code of Money and Credit, promulgated by Decree
No. 13513 dated 1/08/1963.
We will
demonstrate below that Lebanese legislation has enshrined and maintained, for
62 years, i.e., since the enactment of the Code of Money and Credit (in 1963),
the independence of the Central Bank, and that it has also maintained the
coherence (Cohérence) of banking legislation. However, the draft law related to
"reforming the situation of banks in Lebanon and their
restructuring," known as the Bank Resolution Law, which was approved by
the Council of Ministers on April 12, 2025, directly affects the independence
of the Bank of Lebanon and the homogeneity of banking legislation.
From this
standpoint, this study will also address the extent to which the proposed draft
laws and amendments conform to the concept of independence specific to the
Central Bank and warn against adopting these drafts due to the potential
"legal" risks to the structural integrity (Intégrité structurelle) of
the Central Bank, whether through the legislative fragmentation of the
regulatory hierarchy of the Central Bank on which it was established, or in
terms of their violation (the proposed draft laws) of constitutional,
legislative, and administrative principles.
The study will be
divided into two sections:
* The first section addresses the principle of
the independence of the Bank of Lebanon and the correlation of this
independence with ensuring its unity, organization, apparatuses, and their
interconnectedness in carrying out its functions as an administrative
institution independent of any oversight or tutelage from the executive and
governmental authorities. It also addresses the principle of the homogeneity of
banking legislation.
* The second section will identify the points
of legislative fragmentation adopted in the draft law related to reforming the
situation of banks in Lebanon and their restructuring, as approved by the
Council of Ministers on 2025/04/12, and this project's violation of the
principle of independence vested in the Bank of Lebanon.
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Section One: The
Independence of the Bank of Lebanon
1. The Bank of Lebanon, the central bank of the
Lebanese Republic, was established in 1963 by virtue of the law implemented by
Decree No. 13513 issued on August 1, 1963, entitled "Code of Money and
Credit." This law came as a comprehensive and self-sufficient Code that
establishes the Central Bank and regulates the commercial banking sector. Its
final article (Article 230) repealed all legal and regulatory provisions
contrary to its provisions.
2. The independence of the Bank of Lebanon
constitutes a well-established principle explicitly referred to in the
explanatory memorandum of the Code of Money and Credit, and affirmed by the
various standards contained in the provisions of this law.
3. Indeed, the explanatory memorandum of the
draft Code of Money and Credit emphasized the independence of the Bank, stating
the following (pages 10 and 11):
"When
establishing the law and system of the Central Bank, the government's primary
concern was the independence and effectiveness of this institution, so that the
new institution could carry out its mission impartially and in the direction of
the country's permanent interests.
...
The independence
of the Central Bank from political authorities is of the same importance. There
is no doubt that granting the privilege of issuance must be surrounded by
guarantees, and this is what the provisions of the draft law provide, which
regulate the operations of the Central Bank and also regulate state oversight
over it. However, neither the granting of the privilege nor the granting of
capital by the government should make the Central Bank a subordinate interest
to it. Therefore, the project defines the state's relations with the Central
Bank. And the government, inspired, on the one hand, by our country's free
system, and on the other hand, by the evolution, in the practical field (and
despite the texts sometimes) of the concept of relations between public
authorities and central banks, even nationalized ones, decided to leave to the
future Central Bank more initiative and independence, placing its relations
with it on the level of close cooperation that finds its first expression in
the composition of the Central Bank Council itself."
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4. The Central
Bank is an independent public administrative and financial institution (Article
13 of the Code of Money and Credit). In this sense, it enjoys complete
independence from the executive and governmental authorities. By granting it
legal personality, independent from the personality of the State, the
legislator has given the first indication of its intention to grant the Central
Bank independence.
Reference:
Ghaleb
Mahmassani, L'organisation bancaire au Liban, Librairie du Liban, 1968, pages
123 et suivantes.
The independence
granted by the legislator to the Bank of Lebanon is "quasi-total from the
government, whether in determining policies or in their implementation."
This independence is particularly represented in the delegation granted by the
legislator to the Bank of Lebanon, in Article 70 of the Code of Money and
Credit, to do what is necessary to maintain the stability (soundness) of the
Lebanese currency, as it is known that the basic criterion for the independence
of central banks lies in the freedom of movement in matters related to the
national currency. The obligation to agree with the Minister of Finance
whenever the Bank of Lebanon wants to intervene in the foreign exchange market,
whether buying or selling, is only additional proof that the principle is the
complete independence of the Bank in its technical and banking activity, and
the exclusive and explicit exception is the obligation to agree with the
Minister of Finance in this specific case exclusively (in Article 75 of the
Code of Money and Credit).
Reference:
Ghassan El-Ayach,
The Central Bank and the State, Union of Arab Banks, 1998, pages 186, 187, and
189.
5. The
independence of the Central Bank is not merely a transient concept or a
declarative phrase, but rather a fundamental pillar stemming from its being a
public institution enjoying administrative and financial independence.
Therefore, the organization of the Central Bank's bodies, how they are formed
and appointed, and the powers granted to it must be studied in detail to
determine the extent of its independence.
Reference:
Samy Chamas,
L'état et les systèmes bancaires contemporains, Sirey, 1965, page 132.
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6. This
independence is based on three main pillars recognized by jurisprudence and
confirmed by constitutional decisions, namely:
a- Decisional
Authority: The independent public institution must enjoy broad and independent
powers in regulating the sector for which it was established, and it must carry
out its tasks independently of any political or professional authority. This is
indeed what the Bank of Lebanon enjoys, as from a regulatory perspective, it is
the public legal entity entrusted with organizing, managing, and supervising
the financial and banking sector in the country, and ensuring its stability and
soundness (Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit). For this purpose, it
exercises the powers and prerogatives of public authority (Prérogatives de
puissance publique), i.e., taking unilateral administrative decisions binding
on the banking sector (Articles 26, 70, 76, etc. of the Code).
Reference:
René Chapus,
Droit administratif général, Tome 1, 13ème édition, No. 296.
The category of
independent administrative authorities can only have specificity (and the term
authority can only be justified) if it only includes bodies holding, for the
very accomplishment of their mission, decision-making power.
b- Organizational
and Functional Independence: The independent public institution must enjoy
broad and independent powers in regulating the sector for which it was
established, and it must carry out its tasks independently of any political or
professional authority. This is indeed what the Bank of Lebanon enjoys, as from
a regulatory perspective, it is the public legal entity solely responsible for
organizing, managing, and supervising the financial and banking sector in the
country, and ensuring its stability and soundness (Article 70 of the Code of
Money and Credit). The Central Bank also enjoys financial independence and is
not subject to the rules to which public institutions are subject (Article 13),
and special law applies to its operations and employees (Article 33). The
relationship of the Bank of Lebanon with the executive authority shows that
there is no subordinate relationship: the role of the Minister of Finance; and
the presence of the Director General of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Economy in the Central Council (without these two members being able to act
in the Council as delegates).
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from the
government Article 28); and the existence of a government commissioner; all
of this does not affect the independence of the Central Bank, but rather falls
within the framework of what the explanatory memorandum of the Code of Money
and Credit called "close cooperation" between the government and the
Central Bank. This is reminiscent of the provisions of paragraph (e) of the
preamble to the Constitution (which was added to the Constitution in 1990),
which states that "the system is based on the separation, balance, and
cooperation of powers." Thus, between the Bank of Lebanon and the
government (and particularly the Minister of Finance) there is independence and
cooperation. The law has explicitly enshrined this cooperation between the
Central Bank and the government in the sixth section of the second chapter
entitled "The General Mission of the Bank": The Central Bank
cooperates with the government and provides it with advice (Article 71), and
proposes to it measures that it believes would have a beneficial effect.... And
the government consults the Bank on issues... (Article 72).
c- Autonomous
Administrative Nature: Independent public institutions have an autonomous
administrative nature (Caractère propre) that makes them entities in the public
sector not linked to the administrative hierarchy of the state or its central
administration. They perform their tasks in the name and for the benefit of the
Lebanese state and in isolation from any subordination to existing
administrative authorities. Thus, the Central Bank, which enjoys this
specificity, represents the state in the banking and financial sector
independently of other government departments and ministries. It also bears
responsibility for its actions in its own name, not the Lebanese state's, for
matters related to the sector it oversees. It is equally responsible before the
administrative courts or civil courts, or according to decisions it takes that
have a sovereign administrative nature or a commercial administrative nature
(Article 13 of the Code of Money and Credit). The explanatory memorandum of the
law (page 10) states the following: "And the government has decided, given
the public nature of the role that the Central Bank is to play in the economic
life of the country, and considering therefore that this Bank should not have
any profit motive in completing its mission, that the state should provide the
entire capital of the Central Bank." This indicates that the state's
allocation of the capital value to the Central Bank (Article 15) does not
detract from the independence of the Central Bank, but rather strengthens its position
and supports its public-service role. This also explains the provisions of
Article 113 of the law, which regulate the distribution of profits and coverage
of losses of the Bank of Lebanon. The financial independence of the Bank of
Lebanon also explains the fundamental principle
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established by
Article 90 of the Code of Money and Credit, which states that the Central Bank
does not grant loans to the public sector (except in exceptional circumstances
and according to a specific and regulated mechanism in Article 91), despite the
fact that the Central Bank is the bank of the public sector (Article 85). The
government's inability to compel the Central Bank to finance it and to finance
the public sector constitutes one of the most important criteria for the
independence of the Bank of Lebanon.
7. Furthermore, it is useful to point out an
important matter related to the debt securities issued by the Lebanese
government. Eurobonds. The independence of the Central Bank from the government
is of great importance in cases where the government defaults on paying its
dues to its foreign creditors. For example, the immunity enjoyed by foreign
central banks in the United States of America, pursuant to the provisions of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, is granted only for assets held
by foreign central banks for their own account (Hold for its own account). This
means that only the funds used by foreign central banks to conduct their
business are covered by immunity, and anything else is not covered by immunity.
If the foreign state waives its immunity (which the Lebanese state did in the
Eurobonds contracts, waiving immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from
execution), the assets of the Central Bank remain protected by its own
immunity. However, if the foreign government acts as a principal to the Central
Bank and does not maintain an "At arm's length" relationship, then
the Alter Ego theory applies, and the Central Bank loses its immunity over its
assets, as it is considered not independent of the government (which waived its
immunity). Therefore, it is in Lebanon's supreme interest to preserve the
independence of the Bank of Lebanon so that it does not lose its own immunity.
8. All subsequent legislation to the Code of
Money and Credit (1963) has maintained the independence of the Bank of Lebanon
and preserved its exclusive jurisdiction over banking matters, revolving around
and harmonizing with the 1963 law as a coherent whole. For example, but not
limited to, we refer to the following:
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a- Law No. 2/67
issued on 1/16/1967, pertaining to "subjecting banks that cease payment to
special provisions," and Legislative Decree No. 44 issued on 8/5/1967,
which amended some provisions of Law No. 2/67, left the procedures they
stipulate within the sphere of the Bank of Lebanon.
b- Law No. 28/67
issued on 5/9/1967 and amended by the law implemented by Decree No. 14013
issued on 3/16/1970, pertaining to "the establishment of the National
Deposit Guarantee Institution and the amendment and completion of legislation
related to banks and the principles of receivership," established the
Banking Control Commission, the Deposit Guarantee Institution, and the Higher
Banking Authority. Both the Control Commission and the Higher Banking Authority
were established "at the Bank of Lebanon" (Articles 8 and 10).
c- Law No. 161
issued on 8/17/2011 related to "Financial Markets" established a
national authority for financial markets managed by a board chaired by the
Governor of the Bank of Lebanon.
d- Law No. 44
issued on 11/24/2015 related to "Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing" established "at the Bank of Lebanon" the Special
Investigation Commission (SIC), which is independent and chaired by the
Governor of the Bank of Lebanon.
9. All of this
indicates that the Lebanese legislator, for decades (since 1963 and at least
until 2015, the date of issuance of the law on combating money laundering and
terrorist financing), has maintained a logic based on Article 70 of the Code of
Money and Credit, which entrusted the Bank of Lebanon with a general mission of
"preserving the currency to ensure a basis for sustainable economic and
social growth." This mission specifically includes preserving the
integrity of the Lebanese currency, economic stability, the soundness of the
banking system, and also developing the money market (including payment methods
and systems, money transfer operations, clearing and settlement - amendment of
Article 70 by Law No. 133 dated 10/26/1999). Based on this logic, the Bank of
Lebanon must be granted full capabilities to complete its tasks stipulated in
Article 70. In addition to the independence it enjoys, the dispersion of powers
between it and other entities must be avoided, which limits the effectiveness
of its actions, undermines its mission, and dilutes responsibilities. The
independence of the Central Bank is not an absolute concept, but rather it is
linked to a specific objective.
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and the mission
entrusted to it, and in the case of the Bank of Lebanon, the objective and
mission are defined in Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit.
Reference:
Marwan Nsouli,
Recherche sur les critères d'une banque centrale moderne, L.G.D.J., 2023, page
209.
10. Therefore,
alongside the principle of the independence of the Bank of Lebanon, there is
another principle that has been well-established for more than half a century
by successive legislators and governments, which we call the "principle of
coherence of banking legislation" (Principe de cohérence de la législation
bancaire). Every piece of legislation issued after the Code of Money and Credit
in the field of banking and finance has maintained a close link with the Code
of Money and Credit and with the Bank of Lebanon. This can only be justified by
one goal: not to fragment legal provisions and competent authorities, dilute
responsibilities, and undermine the national mission of the Bank of Lebanon
stipulated in Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit. If the legislator did
not consolidate (Consolider) the laws issued in 1967 and 1970 and others
related thereto within the Code of Money and Credit, this does not diminish the
connection of these texts to the Code of Money and Credit, and the principle of
coherence in banking legislation remains established and constant.
11. As a support
for the principle of legislative coherence, the Code of Money and Credit was
formulated in the form of a "legal code" or a set of provisions
related to banking regulation (Code). This is evidenced by the fact that the
Code of Money and Credit came as a regulatory framework for the monetary and
banking sector in its public (Bank of Lebanon) and private (commercial banks,
financial institutions, etc.) branches. It is considered the "supreme
organic law" (Loi organique suprême) under which all subsequent laws and
regulations must be organized. The Code of Money and Credit was divided into 6
chapters: (1) Money, (2) The Central Bank, (3) Banking Regulation, (4)
Penalties, (5) Transitional Provisions, and (6) Miscellaneous and Final
Provisions. This code includes a set of interrelated laws and regulations as a
cohesive and integrated whole (Corpus). Also, any chapter of this code is
organically linked to the other chapters, and the Central Bank is considered
the sponsor and cornerstone of this code, and all other chapters revolve in its
orbit.
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12. The
independence of the Central Bank and the Governor is at the core and essence of
the 1963 set of laws and the Code of Money and Credit (Code de la Monnaie et du
Credit), and therefore:
a- Any amendment
to the set of regulations and laws must aim for and result in further
independence, not its weakening, diminution, fragmentation, or splintering.
b- The Governor
of the Bank of Lebanon has autonomous administrative and executive powers,
specific to him, which rely on independence and hierarchy in decision-making.
c- Transferring
powers from the Central Bank and the Governorship to any other authority,
inside or outside the structure adopted in the 1963 law, exposes the entire
banking sector to chaos and instability.
d- The Governor
possesses supervisory and investigative bodies and arms (committees within the
Central Bank) that enable him to perform his work with complete independence
and thus prevent interference from political authorities in his work.
e- Any
reconsideration of the powers and tasks of the departments organically
affiliated with the Governor (committees and bodies) at the expense of the
Governor and the Central Bank is considered illegal and a blow to the hierarchy
of norms (Hiérarchie des normes) pertaining to the Central Bank.
f- Any legal
amendments to the banking code and the regulations subordinate to the Code of
Money and Credit must be consistent with the hierarchy adopted in the
interrelated texts. Consequently, any amendments to the tasks of the Governor,
the Central Council, or the stipulated committees or bodies cannot ignore the
general principles, especially the principle of hierarchy and the principle of
independence, which is considered the essence of independent banking
regulation.
g- This
independence was deliberately granted to the Central Council and the Governor
specifically to avoid any political or external interference, with the aim of
ensuring the stability of the currency and the soundness of the banking system.
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d- The Governor
of the Central Bank is considered one of the key figures in the state. He is
appointed for a specific term during which he cannot be dismissed except for
specific reasons (resignation, illness, gross misconduct). Consequently, after
their appointment, the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon and his deputies cannot
be dismissed except in strictly limited cases (Article 19); and the Central
Council is the one that establishes their special regulations (Article 33,
paragraph 9), and it also ensures broad independence for them and for the
internal structure of the Central Bank.
13. From this
perspective, any amendment to the set of banking laws must necessarily take
into account the hierarchy adopted in the founding texts, in addition to
preserving and emphasizing the independence of the Central Bank and its
decisions emanating from the Governor. Consequently, any connection with the
political and executive authorities of the state, such as granting
decision-making powers to the Council of Ministers or the Minister of Finance,
who is part of the political authority, must be avoided. In principle, the
Minister has no authority in the narrow sense over independent public
administrative authorities (Autorités administratives indépendantes), foremost
among them the Central Bank. At the very least, there is no exercise of any
hierarchical supervisory authority or tutelage by government agencies.
14. However, the
principle of independence of the Central Bank does not mean that it is an
isolated island within the state or government work. The government or the
competent minister has a presence (Présence) in the work of the Central Bank
through the appointment of a government commissioner by the Ministry of Finance
at the Central Bank, as shown below:
a- Article 41 of
the Code of Money and Credit stipulates that a "Government Commissariat at
the Central Bank" shall be established in the Ministry of Finance. This
department is managed by an employee with the rank of Director General (first
category) who holds the title of "Government Commissioner at the Central
Bank."
b- As stated in
Article 43 of the same law, the decisions of the Council are immediately
communicated to the Government Commissioner. He has, within the two days
following notification, the right to request the Governor to suspend any
decision he deems contrary to the law and regulations and to consult the
Minister of Finance in this regard. If the matter is not decided within five
days from the date of
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suspension, the
decision can be put into effect. This is additional and decisive proof that the
Central Bank is not subject to any supervisory, hierarchical, or tutelary
authority, and that its independence is not isolated from government work and
cooperation with the Ministry of Finance.
c- However, the
presence of the Ministry of Finance through the Government Commissioner does
not obstruct or paralyze the decisions of the Central Council, as the suspended
decision, if not decided upon within five days, becomes effective. It is worth
noting that the same approach is followed in the French Monetary and Financial
Code (Code Monétaire et Financier), where the Government Commissioner at the
Central Bank, appointed by the Ministry of Finance, can request the Central
Bank to reconsider and deliberate on the decision within three days from the
date of its notification, and the Bank, after the expiry of the deadline and
after deliberation, can issue the decision amended or not.
Reference in this
regard, in French law:
Les
considérations générales du Conseil d'État sur les autorités administratives
indépendantes Rapport public nº 52.
15. Having
clarified the principle of the independence of the Central Bank from both
organizational and functional aspects (Indépendance statutaire et
fonctionnelle), we reiterate and emphasize that this independence can only be
understood and applied usefully and effectively if it encompasses and extends
to all bodies, departments, authorities, and committees that are also
organically and functionally linked to the Central Council and the Governor.
This is what can be called complete and integrated unity, and any
destabilization in the organizational structure or the basic tasks of the
affiliated bodies exposes the integrity of the Central Bank to danger, which is
considered a violation of the principle of integrity (Violation du principe
d'intégrité).
16. The authority
of the executive branch (the government) and specifically the Minister of
Finance to participate in the banking system is limited to the appointments of
the Governor, Deputy Governors, and members of the supervisory committees or
other committees specified in the banking regulatory framework. The executive
authority also has the right to attend meetings and object, through the
presence of the supervisory commissioner. However, the presence of the Director
of the Ministry of Finance and the Director of the Ministry of Economy in the
Central Council is considered independent representation of their ministries,
and they must take the oath before the President of the Republic like others.
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of the members
and the governor, and they cannot act in the Central Council as delegates of
the government (Article 28 of the Code of Money and Credit).
17. Any violation
of this hierarchy, principles, and regulations is considered a violation of
organic laws (Loi organique), and consequently a violation of the French
Constitution, as it conflicts with the principle of independence of the banking
system and its freedom from any subordination or attachment to the executive
authority (Principe d'indépendance de la banque centrale).
18. The French
Constitutional Council, which is the highest judicial authority that preserves
fundamental constitutional principles and rights, including the independence of
the Central Bank enshrined in laws, considers this independence a general
principle of monetary and banking stability in the country. Consequently, any
law or amendment that affects this principle exposes the law to challenge and
annulment before the Constitutional Council. Also, any decree or ministerial
decision contrary to the principle of independence and the principle of
non-interference of the executive authority in the work of the Central Bank
exposes this decree or decision to challenge and annulment before the State
Council, due to its conflict with the laws and legal principles stipulated in
the set of laws regulating the monetary and banking sector, foremost among
which is the principle of independence and non-exposure of the government to
the proper functioning of the sector.
19. The Code of
Money and Credit and the legal framework emanating from it are considered, as
we mentioned earlier, constitutive and substantive (Organique) laws that take
precedence over other ordinary laws, as they establish, regulate, and define
the system of the monetary and banking sector in Lebanon, and also regulate the
Central Bank, its structure, and its powers. From this perspective, the basic
statute (Statut) of the Central Bank, as stipulated by the Code of Money and
Credit in its second chapter, is equivalent to an organic law (Loi organique)
as it lays down the constitutive provisions for the Central Bank as a public
administrative institution that oversees the monetary and banking sector in the
country.
20. The Central
Bank, as a legal entity of public law, enjoys financial independence and is
therefore not subject to the rules of administration, conduct of business, and
supervision to which public sector institutions are subject (Article 13 of the
Code of Money and Credit), especially the provisions and legislative decrees
Nos. 114, 115, 117, 118 dated June 12, 1959. Thus, the legislator has exempted
the Central Bank from the supervision to which departments are subject.
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public
administration, and consequently, the Central Bank has a special structure,
apparatuses, and rules different from other public administrations and enjoys
independence and autonomy and is not subject to the supervision of the
executive authority. Any violation of this principle by amending the laws
related to banking regulation, represented by the Code of Money and Credit, is
considered a constitutional violation and exposes any draft law or amendment to
challenge before the Constitutional Council for violating the principle of
independence of the monetary and banking sector.
21. The
establishment and organization of the Central Bank in 1963 is a primary
organization and not the result of previous laws. Before independence, Lebanon
was subject to Ottoman law, and during the French Mandate, the Bank of Syria
and Lebanon was the bank, and the adopted currency was the Syrian-Lebanese
Lira. After independence in 1943, the Bank of Syria and Lebanon became (in
1948) the accredited bank for issuing the Lebanese Lira and was a private
institution under French patronage. From this perspective, the establishment of
the Bank of Lebanon in 1963 under the second chapter of the Code of Money and
Credit is equivalent to an organic law (Loi organique) that defines its
structure and independence, as well as all other subordinate, sponsoring, and
protecting laws, which collectively must be consistent and harmonious with the
provisions and principles set forth in the law, the most important of which is
the principle of general independence, especially from the executive authority
(the government). Therefore, any amendment cannot have legal legitimacy unless
it comes within this structure and provisions.
22. The
independence of the Bank of Lebanon is also reflected in the legitimate
priority of the Central Bank in maintaining the integrity of the currency,
economic stability, and the soundness of the banking system (Article 70 of the
Code of Money and Credit). Accordingly, the Central Bank is a primary, active,
and necessary partner in any modernization process by the governmental and
legislative authorities that affects the Code. From this perspective, Articles
71 and 72 of the Code of Money and Credit, which require the Central Bank to
cooperate with the government and provide it with advice related to monetary
and economic policy, must be read and interpreted. Article 72 also clarified
that the government must consult the Bank on matters related to currency and
invite the Governor of the Bank to participate in its deliberations on these
issues. This confirms the binding nature of consulting the Central Bank for any
modernization or development of the banking system, as the Central Bank is
considered primarily and ultimately responsible for defining and maintaining
the integrity of monetary and financial policy in the country (Articles 33 and
70 of the Code of Money and Credit).
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23. Banking
regulations and central banks worldwide are among the most independent state
institutions, touching upon the principle of sovereignty enshrined in some
countries (see French Law No. 357 dated 05/12/1998, which amended the French
Central Bank system after France joined the European System of Central Banks
and transferred sovereign powers in the monetary and banking sector to the
Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB)). We also find that in
France and Egypt, the governor is appointed by the President of the Republic
and takes an oath before him, and there is no supervision over him except
judicial supervision of his actions and decisions. As for his duties and
powers, he derives them solely from the law, which has granted him independence
in managing, decision-making, regulating the banking sector, and ensuring its
proper functioning and supervision.
24. In comparison
with the systems and laws related to banking regulation in foreign and Arab
countries, it is noteworthy that the independence of the Central Bank and the
Governor is at the core of the laws adopted by them, as follows:
a- The European
Treaty and the commitments stipulated therein have been incorporated into the
core of the French Constitution or what is known as the Constitutional Bloc
(Bloc de constitutionnalité), specifically Article 88-2 of the amended
Constitution of 1992, which incorporated the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFUE), specifically Articles 130 to 282 thereof, which impose
the independence of national central banks from the central governments of
European countries. Also, Law No. 93-980, amended on August 4, 1994, enshrined
the independence of the French Central Bank after incorporating the provisions
and conditions of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which stipulate the following:
(1) The Governor of the Bank of France cannot request or receive any
instructions from the government or any other party, and (2) The Bank of France
determines and implements monetary and banking policy independently within the
Eurosystem.
b- As for the
protection and independence of the Governor, Article L. 142-2 of the Monetary
and Financial Code stipulates that the Governor is appointed by the President
of the Republic for a six-year term, is not subject to dismissal, and cannot be
dismissed for political reasons.
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c- Furthermore,
the constitutionally and legally protected independence of the French Central
Bank has eliminated all government intervention or supervision, and has only
mandated that the Bank and its Governor submit annual reports to the French and
European Parliaments and be heard by them (i.e., the Governor).
Reference:
Loi No. 93-980 du
4 Aout 1993 relative au statut de la Banque de France: La Banque de France en
la personne de son gouverneur ou de ses sous-gouverneurs, ne peut ni solliciter
ni accepter d'instructions du Gouvernement ou de toute autre personne.
d- This
reinforces the independence of the Governor and the French Central Bank from
the executive authority and places them on the same level as it before
Parliament, with the difference that the Governor has no responsibility,
subordination, or accountability before the Bank, unlike the government and
ministers who are responsible for their policies before the French Parliament
or subject to questioning and a vote of no confidence.
e- In summary,
modern or contemporary laws, most importantly European ones, have further
strengthened the protection of the independence of national central banks, and
at their head, the independence of the Governor, by: (a) incorporating European
treaties into the core of European constitutions, (b) adopting European law,
particularly the European TFUE treaty, as an executive tool applicable by
central governments, (c) incorporating European banking regulations within the
set of monetary and financial laws (Code Monétaire et Financier CMF) into local
legislation. This ensures monetary and banking stability and strictly avoids
political interference in the administration and regulation of currency,
monetary policy, and banking.
Reference:
- Decision of the
French Constitutional Council No. 200-437 dated January 12, 2000
- Decision of the
French Constitutional Council No. 2006-540 dated July 27, 2006
- Judgment of the
Court of Justice of the European Union No. C-74 (JCE) dated July 10, 2003.
All of these are
decisions that affirm the independence of the national central bank, the
independence of its work, and its non-compliance with any instructions from
governments.
---
## Page 17
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f- It is more
appropriate for Lebanon to be in the same direction adopted by the European
Union and the laws and treaties incorporated into the systems of member states.
It should be noted that the State of Lebanon adopted the principle of
independence for the Central Bank and its Governor since 1963, when this
independence was not adopted in France or other countries in the free world.
g- In comparison
with banking regulation in the United Arab Emirates, Federal Decree-Law No.
(14) of 2018 concerning the Central Bank and the Regulation of Financial
Institutions and Activities and its amendments stipulated:
Article 2:
Independence of the Central Bank: 1- The Central Bank is considered a federal
public institution with legal personality and enjoys financial and
administrative independence or the legal capacity necessary to carry out all
activities and regulations that ensure the achievement of its objectives. 2-
The provisions of laws related to public finance, tenders, auctions, public
accounting, and public functions shall not apply to the Central Bank, and its
own regulations shall apply in their regard.
Article 10: The
Central Bank shall be managed by a Board of Directors composed of seven
members, including the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Governor.
Article 11(2):
Each of the Chairman of the Board of Directors, his deputies, and the Governor
shall have the rank of minister.
Article 15: The
Board of Directors shall, in particular, exercise the following: adopting
regulations, rules, standards, instructions, and work controls for the
implementation of its tasks and specializations, and taking all necessary
measures and procedures to implement the provisions of this law by decree.
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## Page 18
18
25. As noted, the
legislator's establishment of the Central Bank was intended as a foundational
act to regulate the banking sector. The legislator deliberately affirmed the
principle of the Bank's independence, and this independence revolves around not
subjecting this public institution to any supervisory or tutelary authority, or
even subjecting it to public employment laws, public finance laws, or other
provisions of the public sector to which other administrations and institutions
are subject. Hence, this regulation came in the form of a comprehensive legal
code (Code) with its structure, provisions, and executive, supervisory,
advisory, and even quasi-judicial bodies, through the range of penalties
assigned to the committees affiliated with the Bank, which range from severe
administrative penalties (revoking the license from the bank) to quasi-judicial
civil penalties (such as a bank liquidation decision).
26. As we
mentioned earlier, this structure of the Central Bank and the bodies and
authorities granted to it by the legislator cannot be legally interpreted if
the establishment of the Central Bank was not based on the principle of
independence. It was necessary to translate the principle of independence to
the Central Bank and subsequently to the rest of the affiliated departments and
committees, and to include the tasks carried out by those departments and
committees to ensure the independence of the Central Bank. For how can the
Central Bank define and draw up the state's monetary and banking policy with
complete independence without its executive and supervisory bodies and arms
also enjoying an autonomy that guarantees them freedom of action with complete
integrity and away from governmental and political interference from the rest
of the state's apparatuses?
27. The banking
and monetary policy, which is within the powers of the Central Bank and whose
purpose is to ensure monetary and financial stability in the country and the
proper functioning of banks, cannot be subject to any circumstantial government
policy that may change with the change of governments, or even with the change
of legislative authority. The independence granted to the Central Bank is to
ensure monetary and financial stability in the country and to remove the entire
financial and monetary system from the change of authorities and from current
political objectives. Just as the principle of separation of powers ensures
democratic work in the country, the principle of independence of the Bank of
Lebanon ensures the safety and stability of the financial system in the face of
democratic change of authorities in the country.
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## Page 19
19
28. In addition
to that, and from the standpoint of independence, the Governor of the Bank of
Lebanon is appointed for a six-year term and is not subject to dismissal during
it. This is a long period of time linked to ensuring the stability and
soundness of the monetary and financial system, and it exceeds the terms of
governments and parliamentary councils, which are subject to change or even
paralysis in the event of any constitutional vacuum or disabling political
polarization (as witnessed by Lebanon in its contemporary history).
29. The principle
of independence of the Central Bank cannot be limited to the organizational
framework only. The independence granted by the legislator in the Code of Money
and Credit also extends to the rest of its affiliated bodies and committees. We
mention, for example, that the Central Council and its members (the Governor as
chairman and the Deputy Governors as members) also enjoy independence, whether
in terms of appointment or in the work they carry out. This also applies to the
committees linked to the Council and the Governor, as stipulated in (Article
148) and the subsequent Law No. 28/1967, which establishes and defines the
tasks of the Banking Control Commission and the Higher Committee.
30. From this
perspective, the principle of independence is neither established nor sound
unless it is fully applied to the financial system, its policy, its
apparatuses, and related activities. For example, the Central Council of the
Bank of Lebanon is entrusted with the tasks stipulated in Article 70, which are
not exclusive. Also, the Banking Control Commission, as stipulated in Article 8
of Law 28/67, is an independent committee, as it states, "The Committee is
independent from the other departments in the Central Council, but it is
directly linked to the Governor." This link is considered an organic link,
as this committee must carry out its tasks independently in accordance with the
provisions of Law 28/67, but it prepares its reports and submits its
recommendations directly to the Governor and not to any other person. This
means that the Governor is the guarantor of the independence of the Committee,
like all other bodies and committees affiliated with the Bank of Lebanon. As
for the Higher Banking Authority stipulated in Article 10 of Law No. 28/67,
these departments are organically linked to the Central Bank, specifically to
the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon, and this link cannot be changed, as any
change affects the principle of independence, which is the basis of the
structure and operations of the Bank and its apparatuses, including the
aforementioned Authority, as this Authority is responsible for taking
administrative sanctions against defaulting banks based on referrals from the
Banking Control Commission.
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## Page 20
20
31. Finally, we
point out that the independence of the Bank of Lebanon is not only understood
in relation to constitutional authorities and the public sector, but also in
relation to the private sector, so that the Bank of Lebanon is not under the
influence of commercial banks. This was explicitly expressed in the explanatory
memorandum of the Code of Money and Credit (mentioned above) and justified by
the state's contribution to the capital of the Bank of Lebanon (Article 14 of
the Law) and considered it a merchant in its relations with these banks, and
its operations with them are conducted according to commercial and banking
rules (Article 13 of the Law).
Section Two:
Violation of the Principles of Independence of the Bank of Lebanon and
Homogeneity of Banking Legislation in the Draft Law Relating to Reforming the
Situation of Banks in Lebanon and Their Restructuring
32. The draft law
relating to "reforming the situation of banks in Lebanon and their
restructuring," which was approved by the Council of Ministers on April
12, 2025 (hereinafter, "Reform Draft Law"), directly and
fundamentally affects the principle of independence of the Central Bank and
also the principle of homogeneity of banking legislation. We will demonstrate
below the flagrant violation of the principle of independence and the integrity
of the unity of the monetary and financial system centered around the Central
Bank, and how this project threatens the organizational and functional unity of
the Bank of Lebanon and undermines its independence.
33. This is
evident, for example, from the restructuring and composition of the Higher
Banking Authority, specifically Article 5 of this "Reform Draft Law,"
which amended Article 10 of Law No. 28/67, where the Authority was
reconstituted by creating positions in its membership and excluding positions
that existed by including the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission as a
new member in the Higher Authority. The inclusion of the Chairman of the
Banking Control Commission as a member of the Higher Banking Authority is a
direct violation of the system of the Bank of Lebanon and the hierarchy and
subordination followed in its apparatuses and working departments. Also, the
addition of the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission alongside the
Governor of the Bank of Lebanon and one of the Deputy Governors chosen by the
Central Bank Council makes the Banking Control Commission a supervisory and
reporting body equally, and also makes it an authority antagonistic to the
Governor of the Bank of Lebanon and the Central Council. This is contrary to
the essence of the organization adopted in the law establishing the Bank of
Lebanon and its working mechanism and strikes at the core of the principle of
independence and unity of the Bank.
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## Page 21
21
34. The two main
organs of the Bank of Lebanon are the Governor and the Central Council, as
stipulated in the second section of the second chapter of the Code of Money and
Credit under the title "Organization of the Central Bank." A review
of this section related to the organization of the Central Bank reveals that
the only two organs entrusted with managing and defining the policy of the Bank
and ensuring its integrity are the Governor and his deputies within the Central
Council. Consequently, the Banking Control Commission is not one of the
regulatory bodies of the Bank of Lebanon, but rather a supervisory department
at the Central Bank, completely separate and independent from its other
departments (Article 8 of Law No. 28/67).
35. The inclusion
of the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission among the members composing
the Higher Banking Authority is tantamount to a reorganization of the Central
Bank and a vertical disruption of its structure. Also, granting and authorizing
the Banking Control Commission, through its chairman, to sit as a permanent
member in the Higher Authority alongside the Governor and the Central Council
(which appoints a deputy to the Governor as a member) is a direct coup against
the organization of the Central Bank and its administrative and executive
apparatuses. The Banking Control Commission, through its chairman, has been
given an administrative and reporting position that rivals the position of the
Governor and Deputy Governor, places him on the same level, and bestows upon
him a regulatory status and role not granted to him by the legislator and not
permissible under administrative law and constitutional law. So how can the
chairman of a supervisory body affiliated with the Bank of Lebanon assume an administrative
and reporting position parallel to the Governor, play a broader role than his
banking supervisory role, and sit in a higher banking authority with a
decision-making and adjudicatory role equally? This is a flagrant transgression
of the powers and tasks of the Banking Control Commission and its chairman and
a challenge to the hierarchy and subordination adopted in the organization of
the Central Bank. It is superfluous to say that the Banking Control Commission
is part of this organization and is entrusted with supervisory tasks only.
36. Returning to
the text of Article 148 of the Code of Money and Credit, "Supervision of
banks is entrusted to a department in the Central Bank, completely separate and
independent from its other departments and directly linked to the Governor."
It is therefore understood from this article that the Banking Control
Commission is a department of the Central Bank, separate from its other
departments, but directly linked to the Governor, and its task is to supervise
banks, nothing more. If we review Law 28/67 in its eighth article (8), which
states: "An independent committee for the supervision of banks shall be
established at the Bank of Lebanon, not subject in the exercise of its
functions to the authority of the Bank, and the supervisory department stipulated
in Article 148 of the Code of Money and Credit (1963) shall be attached to
it," where it was stated in the text of the article itself (Article 8)
that the Governor
---
## Page 22
22
of the Bank of
Lebanon to request the committee to conduct a special audit of the situation of
a specific bank." This is conclusive proof that the Banking Control
Commission is within the structure of the Central Bank and operates in
accordance with Article 148 of the 1963 law, and the supervisory department
stipulated in Article (148) is attached to it, and it carries out its
supervisory tasks over banks independently, but remains directly under the
Governor (Article 148). In addition, Article 10 of Law 28/67 stipulated that
the Banking Control Commission must inform the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon
of the overall and individual situations of banks.
37. It should be
noted that the Banking Control Commission, according to Article (8) of Law
28/67, is composed of 5 members appointed by a decree issued by the Council of
Ministers, and the committee is chaired by a specialist in banking or financial
affairs or a university professor specialized in these matters. The Central
Bank has no member within this committee, nor does any government department
(Directorate of the Ministry of Finance) have a member. Consequently, this
committee is a purely technical committee, free from any political
subordination, and is only linked to the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon, as
mentioned above.
38. As for the
Higher Banking Authority and the amendments included in the "Reform Draft
Law," the violations are numerous, whether from the organizational
(Statutaire) or functional (Fonctionnelle) aspects, as we will explain below.
39. The Higher
Banking Authority is considered part of the core of the Central Bank and the
organization enshrined in the Code of Money and Credit, and specifically
defined in its fourth chapter under the title "Penalties." Article
209, amended by the law issued on 3/16/1970, states that the penalties
stipulated in the preceding article are decided by the Higher Banking Authority
established by Article 10 of Law No. 28/67 dated May 9, 1967. This Authority is
composed of the following members: the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon as
chairman, one of the Deputy Governors chosen by the Central Bank Council, the
Director General of Finance, a judge who has practiced law for at least ten
years appointed by decree after the approval of the Higher Judicial Council,
the member appointed upon the proposal of the Association of Banks in the
Supervisory Committee, and the Chairman of the National Deposit Guarantee
Institution. Article 10 states that the Supervisory Committee must successively
inform the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon of the overall and individual
situations of banks, and the Authority has the right to.
---
## Page 23
23
to request the
committee for any additional information on the cases presented to it. This
authority replaces the penalties committee stipulated in Article 209 of the
Code of Money and Credit and applies, when appropriate, the penalties indicated
in Article 208 of the aforementioned law and exercises the powers granted under
this law. It is clear from Article 10 of Law No. 28/67, which is currently in
force, that the Higher Banking Authority is within the structure of the Bank of
Lebanon, and it is entrusted with matters of penalties only, and it is
mentioned and listed in Article 208 of the Code of Money and Credit under the
title of administrative penalties.
40. Article 10 of
Law No. 28/67 has limited the tasks of the Higher Banking Authority to deciding
the penalties indicated in Article 208 of the Code of Money and Credit. It was
also stated in Article 208 that the Central Bank has the right to impose administrative
penalties on the offending bank. It is understood from the interconnection of
the provisions of the Code of Money and Credit and Law No. 28/67 that the
Higher Banking Authority was established to operate within the structure of the
Bank of Lebanon and is an integral part of it, as it is the authority entrusted
with taking and approving administrative penalties on offending banks, based on
the investigations and supervisory actions carried out by the Central Bank
through the Banking Control Commission. The Higher Banking Authority, from this
perspective, is considered a bound authority (Compétence liée) and strictly
limited to administrative penalties on offending banks after the Banking
Control Commission verifies the violations committed by the bank under
investigation (Article 9 of Law No. 28/67) and in accordance with Article 149
of the Code of Money and Credit, which defines the supervisory procedures to be
adopted by the Banking Control Commission.
41. This
interconnection of provisions between the Code of Money and Credit and Law No.
28/67, which established the Banking Control Commission and the Higher Banking
Authority, clearly indicates that the Bank of Lebanon is the first and last
regulator of the monetary and banking sector. Accordingly, the system of the
Higher Banking Authority and its terms of reference are the Central Bank,
headed by the Governor, and nothing else. Consequently, the tasks of the Higher
Banking Authority are limited to imposing administrative penalties on offending
banks in accordance with Articles 148 and 149 of the Code of Money and Credit.
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## Page 24
24
42. What we have
clarified above is the positive and current system in force in the banking
sector within the application of the laws that govern this sector and are
linked to the basic and organic law (Loi organique), i.e., the Code of Money
and Credit issued in 1963. We will demonstrate below the extent of (non-)
conformity of the "Reform Draft Law" with the articles included and
newly introduced therein with the Code of Money and Credit and its subsidiary
laws, most importantly Law No. 28/67. We have previously mentioned, when
discussing the Banking Control Commission, that the composition of the new
Authority adopted in the "Reform Draft Law" constitutes a legal and
administrative violation of banking regulation in Lebanon and a violation of the
principle of independence and unity of the Central Bank and its operating
bodies. Also, the restructuring of the Authority in its entirety is a violation
of the principle of independence and unity of banking regulation under the
banner of the Central Bank (Indépendance et intégrité des statuts et des
fonctions dans le secteur bancaire sous l'autorité de la Banque centrale).
43. The amendment
to Article 10 of Law No. 28/67, as stated in the "Reform Draft Law,"
is marred by several violations, the most important of which are two: limiting
the independence of the Central Bank, and the direct and veiled political subordination
of the Authority. The following is clear from the issue of limiting the
independence of the Central Bank, where the violation occurred in the formation
of the new Higher Banking Authority from newly created members who are not
included in Article 10 currently in force since the approval of Law No. 28/67:
- The inclusion
of the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission in the Higher Banking
Authority is a flagrant violation of the separation of supervision from
punishment at the core of the Code of Money and Credit, which distinguished in
its six chapters between banking supervision assigned to the Supervisory
Committee (Articles 148 and 149) and the administrative punitive authority
assigned to the Higher Banking Authority (Articles 208 and 209).
- The inclusion
of the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission among the members of the
Higher Banking Authority is a fundamental challenge to the structure of the
Central Bank and a reshuffling of tasks between its administrative,
supervisory, and punitive bodies. This strikes at the principle of
independence, which must always guide the structure and role of the Central
Bank in any organizational or functional amendment to it.
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## Page 25
25
- The merging of
supervisory tasks and punitive authority within the Higher Banking Authority
limits the independence of the Central Bank's work and creates competition
between its bodies, i.e., the supervisory body and the punitive body, and
marginalizes the role of the Central Council and the Governor, who sponsor this
independence.
- Article 10, as
amended in the "Reform" draft law, excluded judicial reference in the
formation of the Authority by excluding a judge appointed by decree after the
approval of the Higher Judicial Council. This constitutes another challenge to the
principle of independence of the Authority's work as stated in the Code of
Money and Credit, as the presence of a judge in the Authority's membership was
a guarantee for its work and for the punitive decisions it is authorized to
take. The tasks of the committee are not limited only to matters of assessing
standards and how to prepare them, but rather they go beyond these expertise to
take on a quasi-judicial nature through its decisions that lead to the
liquidation of the bank and the distribution of its assets. This is an act that
goes beyond administrative penalties to include judicial matters for which the
civil courts are competent. Therefore, it is preferable for the membership to
include an experienced judge of high rank sitting in the Higher Banking Authority.
- New members
have been introduced into the Higher Banking Authority, such as legal,
financial, and banking experts, who are named and appointed by the competent
ministers. This is a flagrant violation of the independence of the Authority
and the Central Bank, as the executive authority is not allowed to participate
in the composition of the Authority's members, since this Authority must be
separate from any direct government political interference. Consequently, the
appointment of three experts by the executive authority out of six members who
make up the Authority is a direct violation of the independence of the
Authority and the Central Bank. Furthermore, in the "Reform Draft
Law," the casting vote of the Governor was removed and the decision was
adopted by a majority of four members. Consequently, the Authority becomes,
directly and indirectly, under the tutelage of the experts named and appointed
by the ministers.
- It is not
permissible for an authority affiliated with the Bank of Lebanon or any
independent administrative authority with broad and quasi-judicial powers to
include members from the private professional sector and remove members
affiliated with public administration and the judiciary, as they are the
institutional administrative guarantee for the state.
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## Page 26
26
See the general
report of the French Council of State for the year 2001, dedicated to
independent administrative authorities.
Rapport Public
2001 : Les autorités publiques indépendantes
Page 312: toutes
ces autorités indépendantes ont bien sûr un président qui anime le collège et
dirige les services et peut se distinguer des autres membres par son mode de
désignation, la durée de son mandat ou l'exercice de certaines prérogatives. Ce
président peut être désigné ès qualité, cas du gouverneur de la Banque de
France qui préside de droit la Commission bancaire. Ce président fixe l'ordre
du jour des réunions et a généralement voix prépondérante en cas de partage des
voix.
44. Article 3 of
the "Reform Draft Law," under the title "Objectives of this
Law," stipulated that in applying this law, the following objectives are
sought: (1) strengthening the stability of the financial system, (2) ensuring
the continuity of essential banking functions, (3) protecting deposits in the
liquidation and reform process, (4) limiting the use of public funds in the
process of reforming the situation of banks. After this article defined the
objectives of the "Reform Draft Law" in its Article 3, its Article 5
amended Article 10 of Law No. 28/67 regarding the formation of the Higher
Banking Authority, and the remaining articles of the "Reform Draft
Law" were newly introduced by expanding the powers and tasks of the
Authority completely separately from the Central Bank and from the terms of
reference of its basic bodies (the Central Council and the Governor).
45. In a
comparison between Article 3 of the "Reform Draft Law," which defines
the objectives of this law as strengthening the stability of the financial
system, it becomes clear that this law falls within the structure of banking
regulation entrusted to the Bank of Lebanon and within its structure, as the
Bank of Lebanon, through the Central Council and its powers granted in the Code
of Money and Credit, specifically in Articles 33 and 70 thereof, which we
clarify as follows:
- Article 33
stipulated that the Council... enjoys the following powers without this
enumeration being exclusive: it defines the monetary and credit policy of the
Bank (2) it establishes regulations for the application of this law.
- Article 70
stated that the mission of the Bank includes, in particular, the following: (1)
preserving the integrity of the Lebanese currency (2) preserving economic
stability (3) preserving the soundness of the banking system.
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## Page 27
27
- The
"Reform Draft Law" did not affirm any terms of reference for the
Central Bank, nor did it assign it any regulatory or even advisory tasks in the
process of وضع
المصارف (bank resolution) and their restructuring.
- The
"Reform Draft Law" comes isolated from the Central Bank and its basic
bodies, i.e., the Central Council and the Governor, knowing that the tasks of
defining, drawing up, and applying monetary and financial policy belong to it
and to it exclusively, as can be inferred from the Code of Money and Credit.
46. The Governor
of the Bank of Lebanon and the Central Council have the powers to oversee and
maintain the application of monetary policy and the stability of the financial
system in the country. As for the "Reform Draft Law," it has
installed the Higher Banking Authority in the position of the supreme body of
the Central Bank, ignoring the role and tasks of the Central Council and the
Governor as follows:
- From a banking
authority entrusted with implementing administrative penalties, the Higher
Banking Authority has become the authority that draws up and strengthens the
stability of the financial system and carries out broad tasks of assessment,
evaluation, and approval of bank liquidation without any administrative or
judicial terms of reference.
- From a bound
authority (Compétence liée) in implementing the administrative penalties
specified in Article 208, the Higher Banking Authority has become a
discretionary authority (Pouvoir discrétionnaire) in deciding the fate of
banks, placing them under reform, and carrying out the liquidation process.
- This
discretionary and decision-making authority was never granted to any authority
or committee affiliated with the Bank of Lebanon outside its basic bodies,
i.e., the Central Council and the Governor.
47. Law No.
28/67, which established the Banking Control Commission and the Higher Banking
Authority, clearly defined the tasks of each of these two bodies affiliated
with the Central Bank. The Banking Control Commission was assigned the tasks of
periodic supervision of banks in accordance with Articles 148 and 149 of the
Code of Money and Credit, and this supervision remains linked to the Governor
of the Bank of Lebanon. As for the Higher Banking Authority, its tasks were
limited to imposing the administrative penalties stipulated in Article 208 of
the Code of Money and Credit on banks.
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## Page 28
28
48. Law No. 28/67
granted the Higher Banking Authority the right to approve the receivership of
distressed banks for a limited period of one year from the date of its
establishment, not to exceed the end of 1968 (Article 23 of Law No. 28/67).
Provisions and arrangements for receivership were placed under the supervision
of the Special Banking Court (Article 30 of Law No. 28/67). It can be inferred
from what we have stated that the Higher Banking Authority (before the Reform
Draft Law) is:
- An
administrative body with limited authority to decide on the administrative
penalties specified in Article 148 of the Code of Money and Credit.
- It has the
authority of receivership over distressed banks for a specific period, with a
maximum deadline of 12/31/1968. This authority is placed under the supervision
of the judicial authority, i.e., the Special Banking Court, as the decision of
receivership leading to a type of liquidation of the bank is a judicial
decision that requires adherence to judicial rules and principles, and
consequently entails the separation of administrative authorities from judicial
ones.
- The Higher
Banking Authority must consider the cases presented to it and referred to it by
the Banking Control Commission, which in turn (i.e., the Banking Control
Commission) must successively inform the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon of the
overall and individual situations of banks (Article 10 of Law 28/67).
- It is clear
that both the Committee and the Authority have separate, defined, and
interconnected tasks under the governance of the Bank of Lebanon.
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## Page 29
29
49. As for the
"Reform Draft Law," it came to abolish this entire banking
regulation, under the pretext of strengthening the financial stability system:
- It marginalized
the role of the Central Council and the Governor, as they no longer have any
terms of reference, neither over the Supervisory Committee nor over the
expanded activities assigned to the Higher Banking Authority.
- It expanded the
powers of the Higher Banking Authority to become discretionary powers, and it
was given discretionary authority even over the work of the Banking Control
Commission, which now submits its recommendations to the Authority only, and
the latter has the right not to adopt those recommendations.
- It granted the
Higher Banking Authority the sole authority to decide and report on the
liquidation of banks, and it has full authority in matters of assessment,
appointment of liquidators and temporary managers, defining their tasks, and
dismissing them, without any prior judicial oversight and without any regard
for the right of defense of the bank designated for liquidation or any respect
for the principle of due process that must be respected when administrative
penalties exceed their disciplinary (Disciplinaire) limits to become
quasi-judicial provisions.
50. For all these
reasons, the "Reform Draft Law" is unconstitutional, as it violates
the principle of independence of the Bank of Lebanon from its organizational
and functional aspects, affects the unity of its regulations and provisions,
and exposes monetary and banking policy to danger and government interference.
51. Also, the
"Reform Draft Law" did not respect the principle of separation of
powers, as it granted the Higher Banking Authority decision-making and
discretionary powers in determining penalties for banks, and specifically in
defining and regulating liquidation matters without any prior judicial
oversight or any right of defense for the banks designated for liquidation.
52. The powers
granted to the Higher Banking Authority did not include any legal or judicial
controls for the new tasks assigned to it.
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## Page 30
30
53. It is
well-established in law and constitutional jurisprudence that any
administrative authority possessing the right to impose extensive
administrative penalties must be protected by the legislator with controls and
immunities that guarantee the principle of the right of defense and due process
(Droit de la défense et principe du contradictoire) towards the penalized
individuals.
Reference:
Decision of the French Constitutional Council dated January 17, 1989: No
penalty may be imposed on a licensed person without enabling the latter to
present his observations on the acts attributed to him, as well as the
possibility for the latter to access his specific file.
See also the
decisions of the French Constitutional Council:
DC No. 84-173 du
26 juillet 1984
,DC No. 86-217 du
18 septembre 1986
See also the
report of the French Council of State dated December 8, 1994
"Les
pouvoirs de l'administration dans le domaine des sanctions"
54. The
"Reform Draft Law" did not provide for any legal mechanism or
principles to guarantee the right of the bank designated for liquidation to
defend itself, access its file during investigations, and express its opinion
on the assessment processes and temporary administration carried out against
it. This is a flagrant violation of constitutional principles.
55. The
"Reform Draft Law" did not consider whether the Higher Banking
Authority, in its new form, is exceptional and has exceptional tasks limited in
scope and time. The silence applied by the "Reform Draft Law" in this
regard suggests that this Higher Banking Authority, originally affiliated with
the structure of the Bank of Lebanon, has become a rogue entity outside the
banking and financial fold codified in the Code of Money and Credit, to become
an autonomous authority that rivals and overturns the authority of the Bank of
Lebanon.
56. Marginalizing
the role of the Bank of Lebanon and its basic bodies in preparing and issuing
draft laws that are unrestrained by any banking and financial regulation and
free from any administrative and judicial controls endangers the financial
stability and monetary policy entrusted to the Bank of Lebanon, headed by the
Central Council and the Governor.
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57. One of the
most important features of sound legislation is its readability (Lisibilité).
This is a need for those concerned, for official bodies, for judges, and for
lawyers. Unreadable legislation is not amenable to sound interpretation and
application, and becomes a source of disputes and lawsuits. Even if the various
texts relating to a single subject are not collected in a single text (and this
is the case, as we saw above, with regard to the Code of Money and Credit and
subsequent banking laws), these laws remain readable if they are homogeneous,
without contradiction between them, and without repetition and duplication.
This is what the Lebanese legislator has been keen on since 1963, as each new
law came in harmony with the previous texts, based on a single foundation, and
directed towards a single goal (which is to give the Bank of Lebanon what is
necessary to complete its tasks stipulated in Article 70), and each new body
was independent of the previous bodies without overlap between them. As for the
"Reform Draft Law," it came very far from all of that. Besides its
explanatory memorandum being declarative, unscientific, and brief (half a page)
in a way that does not correspond to a text of this size, this importance, and
this technical complexity (for comparison, the explanatory memorandum of the
draft Code of Money and Credit is 34 pages long), the text of the "Reform
Draft Law" was full of errors. We give one example of this: in the table
of contents, the title of the second chapter is "The Higher Banking
Authority for Reforming the Situation of Banks," while in the body of the
text, the title is "The Authority Competent to Reform the Situation of
Banks." In addition, the first article of this second chapter, which is
Article 10, became unreadable after being amended repeatedly from one draft to
another in the days and hours preceding the approval of the draft law. It is
not understood why Article 10 begins by amending the first and last sections of
Article 10 of Law No. 28/67 regarding the members of the Higher Banking
Authority, while the second chapter is concerned with the authority competent
to reform the situation of banks. The opening paragraph of this Article 10,
which stated that the competent authority is the Higher Authority, was deleted
in one of the drafts.
58. As for the
content of the "Reform Draft Law," its provisions have deprived
banking legislation of all homogeneity. If the objective behind this project
was to establish a mechanism and bodies concerned with reforming the situation
of banks and their restructuring (following the systemic crisis to which the
Lebanese financial and banking sector was exposed) separate from the Bank of
Lebanon and from the current banking legislative system (which only simulated
the individual failure of a specific bank), then it would have been better to
enact a completely separate law from existing laws, including new bodies
unrelated to existing bodies. Even this would not have been correct unless a
period was specified for the application of this law, ending, for example, with
the end of the process of reforming and restructuring the banking sector, so
that this law would be exceptional and limited to resolving the banking crisis.
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arising from the
financial crisis, and after the crisis is resolved, the previous texts would
apply and the newly created bodies in the draft law would be dissolved. This is
what the drafters of the draft law did not do: the "Reform Draft Law"
mixed new bodies with previously existing ones, and changed the name and/or
composition and/or tasks of the latter, without it being understood whether the
new bodies replaced the existing ones only for the needs of applying the
"Reform Draft Law" or also in their current tasks governed by the
laws in force for half a century.
59. The draft
"Reform Draft Law" dated April 4, 2025, included Article (38) which
regulates (in a completely unclear manner) "the extent of application of
other laws and regulations," and stipulates that this law applies
exclusively in the cases and situations mentioned in its provisions, and its
provisions replace the provisions of any laws or other regulations that
conflict with its content, such as the Commercial Code, the Code of Money and
Credit for Laws No. 2/67 and 28/67, and Law No. 110 of 1991, and others. This
Article (38), with all its flaws (how can the new law replace previous laws,
and at the same time use bodies established and regulated in previous laws?),
was deleted from the final draft dated April 12, 2025, which was approved by
the Council of Ministers.
60. Furthermore,
the "Reform Draft Law" included a provision in its Article 23 stating
that the provisions of Chapter 9 of this law apply exclusively to the
liquidation process and replace any laws and other regulations that conflict
with its content. Consequently, the "Reform Draft Law" has further
fragmented the laws regulating the Bank of Lebanon and guaranteeing its
independence. It is clear from this article that it specified that the ninth
chapter of the "Reform Draft Law" related to the liquidation process
replaces any laws and other regulations that conflict with its content, but it
did not, in return, specify any legal precedence for the rest of its articles
and chapters, despite their conflict with the laws regulating the Bank of
Lebanon and other commercial laws that are directly related to the texts of
this project, especially, for example, Article 16 of its fifth chapter, which
defines and expands the powers of the Higher Banking Authority, which has
become solely concerned with the process of reforming the situation of banks in
isolation from the Bank of Lebanon, which originally did not have those powers.
Did this Authority replace the Bank of Lebanon with new powers? Or did it
remain under its supervision and regulations from a purely illusory
perspective? Is it not more appropriate and preferable to grant this
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reform powers to
the Bank of Lebanon, to be subsequently channeled through it to its affiliated
bodies and departments?
61. In the
absence of a serious explanatory memorandum for the "Reform Draft
Law," it is not understood how the provisions of the deleted Article 38
would have been applied, nor is it understood how the "Reform Draft
Law" will now be applied in the absence of a similar article that
establishes a link between the old laws and the new law. What is the reason,
for example, for the confusion between the "competent authority" and
the "Higher Banking Authority"? Is the latter still existing within
the framework of Law No. 28/67, or has it become existing only within the
framework of the "Reform Draft Law"? In the first case, does the
method of its formation noted in the "Reform Draft Law," resulting
from the amendment of Article 10 of Law No. 28/67, also apply within the
framework of the previous laws, or only within the framework of the
"Reform Draft Law"? The same questions arise with regard to the
"Special Court" established by Law No. 110 issued on 11/7/1991
concerning "Reforming the Banking Situation" (Article 15) and adopted
by the "Reform Draft Law" (in Article 29).
We hope that this
study has shed light on the extent and importance of the independence of the
Bank of Lebanon to fortify its role and basic tasks in preserving the integrity
of the Lebanese currency, economic stability, the soundness of the banking system,
and developing the monetary and financial market (Article 70 of the Code of
Money and Credit). It has also shed light on the extent and importance of the
principle of homogeneity of banking legislation, which the legislator has
maintained, despite all difficulties, for 62 years (since the issuance of the
Code of Money and Credit in 1963).
We also hope that
this study has shown how the draft law related to "Reforming the Situation
of Banks in Lebanon and Their Restructuring" in its current form, which
was approved by the Council of Ministers on April 12, 2025, directly affects the
two basic principles upon which the Bank of Lebanon and the entire banking
sector were built: the independence of the Bank of Lebanon and the homogeneity
of banking legislation.
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