# English Translation

> Translated on May 08, 2025

 

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A Legal Study on the Independence of the Bank of Lebanon and the Necessity of Maintaining the Homogeneity of Banking Legislation

 

 

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A Legal Study on the Independence of the Bank of Lebanon and the Necessity of Maintaining the Homogeneity of Banking Legislation

 

This study was prepared with the aim of clarifying the principle of independence inherent to the Bank of Lebanon in accordance with the systems and provisions established in the basic law known as the Code of Money and Credit, promulgated by Decree No. 13513 dated 1/08/1963.

 

We will demonstrate below that Lebanese legislation has enshrined and maintained, for 62 years, i.e., since the enactment of the Code of Money and Credit (in 1963), the independence of the Central Bank, and that it has also maintained the coherence (Cohérence) of banking legislation. However, the draft law related to "reforming the situation of banks in Lebanon and their restructuring," known as the Bank Resolution Law, which was approved by the Council of Ministers on April 12, 2025, directly affects the independence of the Bank of Lebanon and the homogeneity of banking legislation.

 

From this standpoint, this study will also address the extent to which the proposed draft laws and amendments conform to the concept of independence specific to the Central Bank and warn against adopting these drafts due to the potential "legal" risks to the structural integrity (Intégrité structurelle) of the Central Bank, whether through the legislative fragmentation of the regulatory hierarchy of the Central Bank on which it was established, or in terms of their violation (the proposed draft laws) of constitutional, legislative, and administrative principles.

 

The study will be divided into two sections:

 

*   The first section addresses the principle of the independence of the Bank of Lebanon and the correlation of this independence with ensuring its unity, organization, apparatuses, and their interconnectedness in carrying out its functions as an administrative institution independent of any oversight or tutelage from the executive and governmental authorities. It also addresses the principle of the homogeneity of banking legislation.

 

*   The second section will identify the points of legislative fragmentation adopted in the draft law related to reforming the situation of banks in Lebanon and their restructuring, as approved by the Council of Ministers on 2025/04/12, and this project's violation of the principle of independence vested in the Bank of Lebanon.

 

 

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Section One: The Independence of the Bank of Lebanon

 

1.  The Bank of Lebanon, the central bank of the Lebanese Republic, was established in 1963 by virtue of the law implemented by Decree No. 13513 issued on August 1, 1963, entitled "Code of Money and Credit." This law came as a comprehensive and self-sufficient Code that establishes the Central Bank and regulates the commercial banking sector. Its final article (Article 230) repealed all legal and regulatory provisions contrary to its provisions.

 

2.  The independence of the Bank of Lebanon constitutes a well-established principle explicitly referred to in the explanatory memorandum of the Code of Money and Credit, and affirmed by the various standards contained in the provisions of this law.

 

3.  Indeed, the explanatory memorandum of the draft Code of Money and Credit emphasized the independence of the Bank, stating the following (pages 10 and 11):

 

"When establishing the law and system of the Central Bank, the government's primary concern was the independence and effectiveness of this institution, so that the new institution could carry out its mission impartially and in the direction of the country's permanent interests.

 

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The independence of the Central Bank from political authorities is of the same importance. There is no doubt that granting the privilege of issuance must be surrounded by guarantees, and this is what the provisions of the draft law provide, which regulate the operations of the Central Bank and also regulate state oversight over it. However, neither the granting of the privilege nor the granting of capital by the government should make the Central Bank a subordinate interest to it. Therefore, the project defines the state's relations with the Central Bank. And the government, inspired, on the one hand, by our country's free system, and on the other hand, by the evolution, in the practical field (and despite the texts sometimes) of the concept of relations between public authorities and central banks, even nationalized ones, decided to leave to the future Central Bank more initiative and independence, placing its relations with it on the level of close cooperation that finds its first expression in the composition of the Central Bank Council itself."

 

 

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4. The Central Bank is an independent public administrative and financial institution (Article 13 of the Code of Money and Credit). In this sense, it enjoys complete independence from the executive and governmental authorities. By granting it legal personality, independent from the personality of the State, the legislator has given the first indication of its intention to grant the Central Bank independence.

 

Reference:

 

Ghaleb Mahmassani, L'organisation bancaire au Liban, Librairie du Liban, 1968, pages 123 et suivantes.

 

The independence granted by the legislator to the Bank of Lebanon is "quasi-total from the government, whether in determining policies or in their implementation." This independence is particularly represented in the delegation granted by the legislator to the Bank of Lebanon, in Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit, to do what is necessary to maintain the stability (soundness) of the Lebanese currency, as it is known that the basic criterion for the independence of central banks lies in the freedom of movement in matters related to the national currency. The obligation to agree with the Minister of Finance whenever the Bank of Lebanon wants to intervene in the foreign exchange market, whether buying or selling, is only additional proof that the principle is the complete independence of the Bank in its technical and banking activity, and the exclusive and explicit exception is the obligation to agree with the Minister of Finance in this specific case exclusively (in Article 75 of the Code of Money and Credit).

 

Reference:

 

Ghassan El-Ayach, The Central Bank and the State, Union of Arab Banks, 1998, pages 186, 187, and 189.

 

5. The independence of the Central Bank is not merely a transient concept or a declarative phrase, but rather a fundamental pillar stemming from its being a public institution enjoying administrative and financial independence. Therefore, the organization of the Central Bank's bodies, how they are formed and appointed, and the powers granted to it must be studied in detail to determine the extent of its independence.

 

Reference:

 

Samy Chamas, L'état et les systèmes bancaires contemporains, Sirey, 1965, page 132.

 

 

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6. This independence is based on three main pillars recognized by jurisprudence and confirmed by constitutional decisions, namely:

 

a- Decisional Authority: The independent public institution must enjoy broad and independent powers in regulating the sector for which it was established, and it must carry out its tasks independently of any political or professional authority. This is indeed what the Bank of Lebanon enjoys, as from a regulatory perspective, it is the public legal entity entrusted with organizing, managing, and supervising the financial and banking sector in the country, and ensuring its stability and soundness (Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit). For this purpose, it exercises the powers and prerogatives of public authority (Prérogatives de puissance publique), i.e., taking unilateral administrative decisions binding on the banking sector (Articles 26, 70, 76, etc. of the Code).

 

Reference:

 

René Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 1, 13ème édition, No. 296.

 

The category of independent administrative authorities can only have specificity (and the term authority can only be justified) if it only includes bodies holding, for the very accomplishment of their mission, decision-making power.

 

b- Organizational and Functional Independence: The independent public institution must enjoy broad and independent powers in regulating the sector for which it was established, and it must carry out its tasks independently of any political or professional authority. This is indeed what the Bank of Lebanon enjoys, as from a regulatory perspective, it is the public legal entity solely responsible for organizing, managing, and supervising the financial and banking sector in the country, and ensuring its stability and soundness (Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit). The Central Bank also enjoys financial independence and is not subject to the rules to which public institutions are subject (Article 13), and special law applies to its operations and employees (Article 33). The relationship of the Bank of Lebanon with the executive authority shows that there is no subordinate relationship: the role of the Minister of Finance; and the presence of the Director General of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy in the Central Council (without these two members being able to act in the Council as delegates).

 

 

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from the government – Article 28); and the existence of a government commissioner; all of this does not affect the independence of the Central Bank, but rather falls within the framework of what the explanatory memorandum of the Code of Money and Credit called "close cooperation" between the government and the Central Bank. This is reminiscent of the provisions of paragraph (e) of the preamble to the Constitution (which was added to the Constitution in 1990), which states that "the system is based on the separation, balance, and cooperation of powers." Thus, between the Bank of Lebanon and the government (and particularly the Minister of Finance) there is independence and cooperation. The law has explicitly enshrined this cooperation between the Central Bank and the government in the sixth section of the second chapter entitled "The General Mission of the Bank": The Central Bank cooperates with the government and provides it with advice (Article 71), and proposes to it measures that it believes would have a beneficial effect.... And the government consults the Bank on issues... (Article 72).

 

c- Autonomous Administrative Nature: Independent public institutions have an autonomous administrative nature (Caractère propre) that makes them entities in the public sector not linked to the administrative hierarchy of the state or its central administration. They perform their tasks in the name and for the benefit of the Lebanese state and in isolation from any subordination to existing administrative authorities. Thus, the Central Bank, which enjoys this specificity, represents the state in the banking and financial sector independently of other government departments and ministries. It also bears responsibility for its actions in its own name, not the Lebanese state's, for matters related to the sector it oversees. It is equally responsible before the administrative courts or civil courts, or according to decisions it takes that have a sovereign administrative nature or a commercial administrative nature (Article 13 of the Code of Money and Credit). The explanatory memorandum of the law (page 10) states the following: "And the government has decided, given the public nature of the role that the Central Bank is to play in the economic life of the country, and considering therefore that this Bank should not have any profit motive in completing its mission, that the state should provide the entire capital of the Central Bank." This indicates that the state's allocation of the capital value to the Central Bank (Article 15) does not detract from the independence of the Central Bank, but rather strengthens its position and supports its public-service role. This also explains the provisions of Article 113 of the law, which regulate the distribution of profits and coverage of losses of the Bank of Lebanon. The financial independence of the Bank of Lebanon also explains the fundamental principle

 

 

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established by Article 90 of the Code of Money and Credit, which states that the Central Bank does not grant loans to the public sector (except in exceptional circumstances and according to a specific and regulated mechanism in Article 91), despite the fact that the Central Bank is the bank of the public sector (Article 85). The government's inability to compel the Central Bank to finance it and to finance the public sector constitutes one of the most important criteria for the independence of the Bank of Lebanon.

 

7.  Furthermore, it is useful to point out an important matter related to the debt securities issued by the Lebanese government. Eurobonds. The independence of the Central Bank from the government is of great importance in cases where the government defaults on paying its dues to its foreign creditors. For example, the immunity enjoyed by foreign central banks in the United States of America, pursuant to the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, is granted only for assets held by foreign central banks for their own account (Hold for its own account). This means that only the funds used by foreign central banks to conduct their business are covered by immunity, and anything else is not covered by immunity. If the foreign state waives its immunity (which the Lebanese state did in the Eurobonds contracts, waiving immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from execution), the assets of the Central Bank remain protected by its own immunity. However, if the foreign government acts as a principal to the Central Bank and does not maintain an "At arm's length" relationship, then the Alter Ego theory applies, and the Central Bank loses its immunity over its assets, as it is considered not independent of the government (which waived its immunity). Therefore, it is in Lebanon's supreme interest to preserve the independence of the Bank of Lebanon so that it does not lose its own immunity.

 

8.  All subsequent legislation to the Code of Money and Credit (1963) has maintained the independence of the Bank of Lebanon and preserved its exclusive jurisdiction over banking matters, revolving around and harmonizing with the 1963 law as a coherent whole. For example, but not limited to, we refer to the following:

 

 

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a- Law No. 2/67 issued on 1/16/1967, pertaining to "subjecting banks that cease payment to special provisions," and Legislative Decree No. 44 issued on 8/5/1967, which amended some provisions of Law No. 2/67, left the procedures they stipulate within the sphere of the Bank of Lebanon.

 

b- Law No. 28/67 issued on 5/9/1967 and amended by the law implemented by Decree No. 14013 issued on 3/16/1970, pertaining to "the establishment of the National Deposit Guarantee Institution and the amendment and completion of legislation related to banks and the principles of receivership," established the Banking Control Commission, the Deposit Guarantee Institution, and the Higher Banking Authority. Both the Control Commission and the Higher Banking Authority were established "at the Bank of Lebanon" (Articles 8 and 10).

 

c- Law No. 161 issued on 8/17/2011 related to "Financial Markets" established a national authority for financial markets managed by a board chaired by the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon.

 

d- Law No. 44 issued on 11/24/2015 related to "Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing" established "at the Bank of Lebanon" the Special Investigation Commission (SIC), which is independent and chaired by the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon.

 

9. All of this indicates that the Lebanese legislator, for decades (since 1963 and at least until 2015, the date of issuance of the law on combating money laundering and terrorist financing), has maintained a logic based on Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit, which entrusted the Bank of Lebanon with a general mission of "preserving the currency to ensure a basis for sustainable economic and social growth." This mission specifically includes preserving the integrity of the Lebanese currency, economic stability, the soundness of the banking system, and also developing the money market (including payment methods and systems, money transfer operations, clearing and settlement - amendment of Article 70 by Law No. 133 dated 10/26/1999). Based on this logic, the Bank of Lebanon must be granted full capabilities to complete its tasks stipulated in Article 70. In addition to the independence it enjoys, the dispersion of powers between it and other entities must be avoided, which limits the effectiveness of its actions, undermines its mission, and dilutes responsibilities. The independence of the Central Bank is not an absolute concept, but rather it is linked to a specific objective.

 

 

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and the mission entrusted to it, and in the case of the Bank of Lebanon, the objective and mission are defined in Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit.

 

Reference:

 

Marwan Nsouli, Recherche sur les critères d'une banque centrale moderne, L.G.D.J., 2023, page 209.

 

10. Therefore, alongside the principle of the independence of the Bank of Lebanon, there is another principle that has been well-established for more than half a century by successive legislators and governments, which we call the "principle of coherence of banking legislation" (Principe de cohérence de la législation bancaire). Every piece of legislation issued after the Code of Money and Credit in the field of banking and finance has maintained a close link with the Code of Money and Credit and with the Bank of Lebanon. This can only be justified by one goal: not to fragment legal provisions and competent authorities, dilute responsibilities, and undermine the national mission of the Bank of Lebanon stipulated in Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit. If the legislator did not consolidate (Consolider) the laws issued in 1967 and 1970 and others related thereto within the Code of Money and Credit, this does not diminish the connection of these texts to the Code of Money and Credit, and the principle of coherence in banking legislation remains established and constant.

 

11. As a support for the principle of legislative coherence, the Code of Money and Credit was formulated in the form of a "legal code" or a set of provisions related to banking regulation (Code). This is evidenced by the fact that the Code of Money and Credit came as a regulatory framework for the monetary and banking sector in its public (Bank of Lebanon) and private (commercial banks, financial institutions, etc.) branches. It is considered the "supreme organic law" (Loi organique suprême) under which all subsequent laws and regulations must be organized. The Code of Money and Credit was divided into 6 chapters: (1) Money, (2) The Central Bank, (3) Banking Regulation, (4) Penalties, (5) Transitional Provisions, and (6) Miscellaneous and Final Provisions. This code includes a set of interrelated laws and regulations as a cohesive and integrated whole (Corpus). Also, any chapter of this code is organically linked to the other chapters, and the Central Bank is considered the sponsor and cornerstone of this code, and all other chapters revolve in its orbit.

 

 

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12. The independence of the Central Bank and the Governor is at the core and essence of the 1963 set of laws and the Code of Money and Credit (Code de la Monnaie et du Credit), and therefore:

 

a- Any amendment to the set of regulations and laws must aim for and result in further independence, not its weakening, diminution, fragmentation, or splintering.

 

b- The Governor of the Bank of Lebanon has autonomous administrative and executive powers, specific to him, which rely on independence and hierarchy in decision-making.

 

c- Transferring powers from the Central Bank and the Governorship to any other authority, inside or outside the structure adopted in the 1963 law, exposes the entire banking sector to chaos and instability.

 

d- The Governor possesses supervisory and investigative bodies and arms (committees within the Central Bank) that enable him to perform his work with complete independence and thus prevent interference from political authorities in his work.

 

e- Any reconsideration of the powers and tasks of the departments organically affiliated with the Governor (committees and bodies) at the expense of the Governor and the Central Bank is considered illegal and a blow to the hierarchy of norms (Hiérarchie des normes) pertaining to the Central Bank.

 

f- Any legal amendments to the banking code and the regulations subordinate to the Code of Money and Credit must be consistent with the hierarchy adopted in the interrelated texts. Consequently, any amendments to the tasks of the Governor, the Central Council, or the stipulated committees or bodies cannot ignore the general principles, especially the principle of hierarchy and the principle of independence, which is considered the essence of independent banking regulation.

 

g- This independence was deliberately granted to the Central Council and the Governor specifically to avoid any political or external interference, with the aim of ensuring the stability of the currency and the soundness of the banking system.

 

 

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d- The Governor of the Central Bank is considered one of the key figures in the state. He is appointed for a specific term during which he cannot be dismissed except for specific reasons (resignation, illness, gross misconduct). Consequently, after their appointment, the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon and his deputies cannot be dismissed except in strictly limited cases (Article 19); and the Central Council is the one that establishes their special regulations (Article 33, paragraph 9), and it also ensures broad independence for them and for the internal structure of the Central Bank.

 

13. From this perspective, any amendment to the set of banking laws must necessarily take into account the hierarchy adopted in the founding texts, in addition to preserving and emphasizing the independence of the Central Bank and its decisions emanating from the Governor. Consequently, any connection with the political and executive authorities of the state, such as granting decision-making powers to the Council of Ministers or the Minister of Finance, who is part of the political authority, must be avoided. In principle, the Minister has no authority in the narrow sense over independent public administrative authorities (Autorités administratives indépendantes), foremost among them the Central Bank. At the very least, there is no exercise of any hierarchical supervisory authority or tutelage by government agencies.

 

14. However, the principle of independence of the Central Bank does not mean that it is an isolated island within the state or government work. The government or the competent minister has a presence (Présence) in the work of the Central Bank through the appointment of a government commissioner by the Ministry of Finance at the Central Bank, as shown below:

 

a- Article 41 of the Code of Money and Credit stipulates that a "Government Commissariat at the Central Bank" shall be established in the Ministry of Finance. This department is managed by an employee with the rank of Director General (first category) who holds the title of "Government Commissioner at the Central Bank."

 

b- As stated in Article 43 of the same law, the decisions of the Council are immediately communicated to the Government Commissioner. He has, within the two days following notification, the right to request the Governor to suspend any decision he deems contrary to the law and regulations and to consult the Minister of Finance in this regard. If the matter is not decided within five days from the date of

 

 

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suspension, the decision can be put into effect. This is additional and decisive proof that the Central Bank is not subject to any supervisory, hierarchical, or tutelary authority, and that its independence is not isolated from government work and cooperation with the Ministry of Finance.

 

c- However, the presence of the Ministry of Finance through the Government Commissioner does not obstruct or paralyze the decisions of the Central Council, as the suspended decision, if not decided upon within five days, becomes effective. It is worth noting that the same approach is followed in the French Monetary and Financial Code (Code Monétaire et Financier), where the Government Commissioner at the Central Bank, appointed by the Ministry of Finance, can request the Central Bank to reconsider and deliberate on the decision within three days from the date of its notification, and the Bank, after the expiry of the deadline and after deliberation, can issue the decision amended or not.

 

Reference in this regard, in French law:

 

Les considérations générales du Conseil d'État sur les autorités administratives indépendantes – Rapport public nº 52.

 

15. Having clarified the principle of the independence of the Central Bank from both organizational and functional aspects (Indépendance statutaire et fonctionnelle), we reiterate and emphasize that this independence can only be understood and applied usefully and effectively if it encompasses and extends to all bodies, departments, authorities, and committees that are also organically and functionally linked to the Central Council and the Governor. This is what can be called complete and integrated unity, and any destabilization in the organizational structure or the basic tasks of the affiliated bodies exposes the integrity of the Central Bank to danger, which is considered a violation of the principle of integrity (Violation du principe d'intégrité).

 

16. The authority of the executive branch (the government) and specifically the Minister of Finance to participate in the banking system is limited to the appointments of the Governor, Deputy Governors, and members of the supervisory committees or other committees specified in the banking regulatory framework. The executive authority also has the right to attend meetings and object, through the presence of the supervisory commissioner. However, the presence of the Director of the Ministry of Finance and the Director of the Ministry of Economy in the Central Council is considered independent representation of their ministries, and they must take the oath before the President of the Republic like others.

 

 

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of the members and the governor, and they cannot act in the Central Council as delegates of the government (Article 28 of the Code of Money and Credit).

 

17. Any violation of this hierarchy, principles, and regulations is considered a violation of organic laws (Loi organique), and consequently a violation of the French Constitution, as it conflicts with the principle of independence of the banking system and its freedom from any subordination or attachment to the executive authority (Principe d'indépendance de la banque centrale).

 

18. The French Constitutional Council, which is the highest judicial authority that preserves fundamental constitutional principles and rights, including the independence of the Central Bank enshrined in laws, considers this independence a general principle of monetary and banking stability in the country. Consequently, any law or amendment that affects this principle exposes the law to challenge and annulment before the Constitutional Council. Also, any decree or ministerial decision contrary to the principle of independence and the principle of non-interference of the executive authority in the work of the Central Bank exposes this decree or decision to challenge and annulment before the State Council, due to its conflict with the laws and legal principles stipulated in the set of laws regulating the monetary and banking sector, foremost among which is the principle of independence and non-exposure of the government to the proper functioning of the sector.

 

19. The Code of Money and Credit and the legal framework emanating from it are considered, as we mentioned earlier, constitutive and substantive (Organique) laws that take precedence over other ordinary laws, as they establish, regulate, and define the system of the monetary and banking sector in Lebanon, and also regulate the Central Bank, its structure, and its powers. From this perspective, the basic statute (Statut) of the Central Bank, as stipulated by the Code of Money and Credit in its second chapter, is equivalent to an organic law (Loi organique) as it lays down the constitutive provisions for the Central Bank as a public administrative institution that oversees the monetary and banking sector in the country.

 

20. The Central Bank, as a legal entity of public law, enjoys financial independence and is therefore not subject to the rules of administration, conduct of business, and supervision to which public sector institutions are subject (Article 13 of the Code of Money and Credit), especially the provisions and legislative decrees Nos. 114, 115, 117, 118 dated June 12, 1959. Thus, the legislator has exempted the Central Bank from the supervision to which departments are subject.

 

 

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public administration, and consequently, the Central Bank has a special structure, apparatuses, and rules different from other public administrations and enjoys independence and autonomy and is not subject to the supervision of the executive authority. Any violation of this principle by amending the laws related to banking regulation, represented by the Code of Money and Credit, is considered a constitutional violation and exposes any draft law or amendment to challenge before the Constitutional Council for violating the principle of independence of the monetary and banking sector.

 

21. The establishment and organization of the Central Bank in 1963 is a primary organization and not the result of previous laws. Before independence, Lebanon was subject to Ottoman law, and during the French Mandate, the Bank of Syria and Lebanon was the bank, and the adopted currency was the Syrian-Lebanese Lira. After independence in 1943, the Bank of Syria and Lebanon became (in 1948) the accredited bank for issuing the Lebanese Lira and was a private institution under French patronage. From this perspective, the establishment of the Bank of Lebanon in 1963 under the second chapter of the Code of Money and Credit is equivalent to an organic law (Loi organique) that defines its structure and independence, as well as all other subordinate, sponsoring, and protecting laws, which collectively must be consistent and harmonious with the provisions and principles set forth in the law, the most important of which is the principle of general independence, especially from the executive authority (the government). Therefore, any amendment cannot have legal legitimacy unless it comes within this structure and provisions.

 

22. The independence of the Bank of Lebanon is also reflected in the legitimate priority of the Central Bank in maintaining the integrity of the currency, economic stability, and the soundness of the banking system (Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit). Accordingly, the Central Bank is a primary, active, and necessary partner in any modernization process by the governmental and legislative authorities that affects the Code. From this perspective, Articles 71 and 72 of the Code of Money and Credit, which require the Central Bank to cooperate with the government and provide it with advice related to monetary and economic policy, must be read and interpreted. Article 72 also clarified that the government must consult the Bank on matters related to currency and invite the Governor of the Bank to participate in its deliberations on these issues. This confirms the binding nature of consulting the Central Bank for any modernization or development of the banking system, as the Central Bank is considered primarily and ultimately responsible for defining and maintaining the integrity of monetary and financial policy in the country (Articles 33 and 70 of the Code of Money and Credit).

 

 

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23. Banking regulations and central banks worldwide are among the most independent state institutions, touching upon the principle of sovereignty enshrined in some countries (see French Law No. 357 dated 05/12/1998, which amended the French Central Bank system after France joined the European System of Central Banks and transferred sovereign powers in the monetary and banking sector to the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB)). We also find that in France and Egypt, the governor is appointed by the President of the Republic and takes an oath before him, and there is no supervision over him except judicial supervision of his actions and decisions. As for his duties and powers, he derives them solely from the law, which has granted him independence in managing, decision-making, regulating the banking sector, and ensuring its proper functioning and supervision.

 

24. In comparison with the systems and laws related to banking regulation in foreign and Arab countries, it is noteworthy that the independence of the Central Bank and the Governor is at the core of the laws adopted by them, as follows:

 

a- The European Treaty and the commitments stipulated therein have been incorporated into the core of the French Constitution or what is known as the Constitutional Bloc (Bloc de constitutionnalité), specifically Article 88-2 of the amended Constitution of 1992, which incorporated the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE), specifically Articles 130 to 282 thereof, which impose the independence of national central banks from the central governments of European countries. Also, Law No. 93-980, amended on August 4, 1994, enshrined the independence of the French Central Bank after incorporating the provisions and conditions of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which stipulate the following: (1) The Governor of the Bank of France cannot request or receive any instructions from the government or any other party, and (2) The Bank of France determines and implements monetary and banking policy independently within the Eurosystem.

 

b- As for the protection and independence of the Governor, Article L. 142-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code stipulates that the Governor is appointed by the President of the Republic for a six-year term, is not subject to dismissal, and cannot be dismissed for political reasons.

 

 

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c- Furthermore, the constitutionally and legally protected independence of the French Central Bank has eliminated all government intervention or supervision, and has only mandated that the Bank and its Governor submit annual reports to the French and European Parliaments and be heard by them (i.e., the Governor).

 

Reference:

 

Loi No. 93-980 du 4 Aout 1993 relative au statut de la Banque de France: La Banque de France en la personne de son gouverneur ou de ses sous-gouverneurs, ne peut ni solliciter ni accepter d'instructions du Gouvernement ou de toute autre personne.

 

d- This reinforces the independence of the Governor and the French Central Bank from the executive authority and places them on the same level as it before Parliament, with the difference that the Governor has no responsibility, subordination, or accountability before the Bank, unlike the government and ministers who are responsible for their policies before the French Parliament or subject to questioning and a vote of no confidence.

 

e- In summary, modern or contemporary laws, most importantly European ones, have further strengthened the protection of the independence of national central banks, and at their head, the independence of the Governor, by: (a) incorporating European treaties into the core of European constitutions, (b) adopting European law, particularly the European TFUE treaty, as an executive tool applicable by central governments, (c) incorporating European banking regulations within the set of monetary and financial laws (Code Monétaire et Financier CMF) into local legislation. This ensures monetary and banking stability and strictly avoids political interference in the administration and regulation of currency, monetary policy, and banking.

 

Reference:

 

- Decision of the French Constitutional Council No. 200-437 dated January 12, 2000

 

- Decision of the French Constitutional Council No. 2006-540 dated July 27, 2006

 

- Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union No. C-74 (JCE) dated July 10, 2003.

 

All of these are decisions that affirm the independence of the national central bank, the independence of its work, and its non-compliance with any instructions from governments.

 

 

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f- It is more appropriate for Lebanon to be in the same direction adopted by the European Union and the laws and treaties incorporated into the systems of member states. It should be noted that the State of Lebanon adopted the principle of independence for the Central Bank and its Governor since 1963, when this independence was not adopted in France or other countries in the free world.

 

g- In comparison with banking regulation in the United Arab Emirates, Federal Decree-Law No. (14) of 2018 concerning the Central Bank and the Regulation of Financial Institutions and Activities and its amendments stipulated:

 

Article 2: Independence of the Central Bank: 1- The Central Bank is considered a federal public institution with legal personality and enjoys financial and administrative independence or the legal capacity necessary to carry out all activities and regulations that ensure the achievement of its objectives. 2- The provisions of laws related to public finance, tenders, auctions, public accounting, and public functions shall not apply to the Central Bank, and its own regulations shall apply in their regard.

 

Article 10: The Central Bank shall be managed by a Board of Directors composed of seven members, including the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Governor.

 

Article 11(2): Each of the Chairman of the Board of Directors, his deputies, and the Governor shall have the rank of minister.

 

Article 15: The Board of Directors shall, in particular, exercise the following: adopting regulations, rules, standards, instructions, and work controls for the implementation of its tasks and specializations, and taking all necessary measures and procedures to implement the provisions of this law by decree.

 

 

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25. As noted, the legislator's establishment of the Central Bank was intended as a foundational act to regulate the banking sector. The legislator deliberately affirmed the principle of the Bank's independence, and this independence revolves around not subjecting this public institution to any supervisory or tutelary authority, or even subjecting it to public employment laws, public finance laws, or other provisions of the public sector to which other administrations and institutions are subject. Hence, this regulation came in the form of a comprehensive legal code (Code) with its structure, provisions, and executive, supervisory, advisory, and even quasi-judicial bodies, through the range of penalties assigned to the committees affiliated with the Bank, which range from severe administrative penalties (revoking the license from the bank) to quasi-judicial civil penalties (such as a bank liquidation decision).

 

26. As we mentioned earlier, this structure of the Central Bank and the bodies and authorities granted to it by the legislator cannot be legally interpreted if the establishment of the Central Bank was not based on the principle of independence. It was necessary to translate the principle of independence to the Central Bank and subsequently to the rest of the affiliated departments and committees, and to include the tasks carried out by those departments and committees to ensure the independence of the Central Bank. For how can the Central Bank define and draw up the state's monetary and banking policy with complete independence without its executive and supervisory bodies and arms also enjoying an autonomy that guarantees them freedom of action with complete integrity and away from governmental and political interference from the rest of the state's apparatuses?

 

27. The banking and monetary policy, which is within the powers of the Central Bank and whose purpose is to ensure monetary and financial stability in the country and the proper functioning of banks, cannot be subject to any circumstantial government policy that may change with the change of governments, or even with the change of legislative authority. The independence granted to the Central Bank is to ensure monetary and financial stability in the country and to remove the entire financial and monetary system from the change of authorities and from current political objectives. Just as the principle of separation of powers ensures democratic work in the country, the principle of independence of the Bank of Lebanon ensures the safety and stability of the financial system in the face of democratic change of authorities in the country.

 

 

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28. In addition to that, and from the standpoint of independence, the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon is appointed for a six-year term and is not subject to dismissal during it. This is a long period of time linked to ensuring the stability and soundness of the monetary and financial system, and it exceeds the terms of governments and parliamentary councils, which are subject to change or even paralysis in the event of any constitutional vacuum or disabling political polarization (as witnessed by Lebanon in its contemporary history).

 

29. The principle of independence of the Central Bank cannot be limited to the organizational framework only. The independence granted by the legislator in the Code of Money and Credit also extends to the rest of its affiliated bodies and committees. We mention, for example, that the Central Council and its members (the Governor as chairman and the Deputy Governors as members) also enjoy independence, whether in terms of appointment or in the work they carry out. This also applies to the committees linked to the Council and the Governor, as stipulated in (Article 148) and the subsequent Law No. 28/1967, which establishes and defines the tasks of the Banking Control Commission and the Higher Committee.

 

30. From this perspective, the principle of independence is neither established nor sound unless it is fully applied to the financial system, its policy, its apparatuses, and related activities. For example, the Central Council of the Bank of Lebanon is entrusted with the tasks stipulated in Article 70, which are not exclusive. Also, the Banking Control Commission, as stipulated in Article 8 of Law 28/67, is an independent committee, as it states, "The Committee is independent from the other departments in the Central Council, but it is directly linked to the Governor." This link is considered an organic link, as this committee must carry out its tasks independently in accordance with the provisions of Law 28/67, but it prepares its reports and submits its recommendations directly to the Governor and not to any other person. This means that the Governor is the guarantor of the independence of the Committee, like all other bodies and committees affiliated with the Bank of Lebanon. As for the Higher Banking Authority stipulated in Article 10 of Law No. 28/67, these departments are organically linked to the Central Bank, specifically to the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon, and this link cannot be changed, as any change affects the principle of independence, which is the basis of the structure and operations of the Bank and its apparatuses, including the aforementioned Authority, as this Authority is responsible for taking administrative sanctions against defaulting banks based on referrals from the Banking Control Commission.

 

 

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31. Finally, we point out that the independence of the Bank of Lebanon is not only understood in relation to constitutional authorities and the public sector, but also in relation to the private sector, so that the Bank of Lebanon is not under the influence of commercial banks. This was explicitly expressed in the explanatory memorandum of the Code of Money and Credit (mentioned above) and justified by the state's contribution to the capital of the Bank of Lebanon (Article 14 of the Law) and considered it a merchant in its relations with these banks, and its operations with them are conducted according to commercial and banking rules (Article 13 of the Law).

 

Section Two: Violation of the Principles of Independence of the Bank of Lebanon and Homogeneity of Banking Legislation in the Draft Law Relating to Reforming the Situation of Banks in Lebanon and Their Restructuring

 

32. The draft law relating to "reforming the situation of banks in Lebanon and their restructuring," which was approved by the Council of Ministers on April 12, 2025 (hereinafter, "Reform Draft Law"), directly and fundamentally affects the principle of independence of the Central Bank and also the principle of homogeneity of banking legislation. We will demonstrate below the flagrant violation of the principle of independence and the integrity of the unity of the monetary and financial system centered around the Central Bank, and how this project threatens the organizational and functional unity of the Bank of Lebanon and undermines its independence.

 

33. This is evident, for example, from the restructuring and composition of the Higher Banking Authority, specifically Article 5 of this "Reform Draft Law," which amended Article 10 of Law No. 28/67, where the Authority was reconstituted by creating positions in its membership and excluding positions that existed by including the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission as a new member in the Higher Authority. The inclusion of the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission as a member of the Higher Banking Authority is a direct violation of the system of the Bank of Lebanon and the hierarchy and subordination followed in its apparatuses and working departments. Also, the addition of the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission alongside the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon and one of the Deputy Governors chosen by the Central Bank Council makes the Banking Control Commission a supervisory and reporting body equally, and also makes it an authority antagonistic to the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon and the Central Council. This is contrary to the essence of the organization adopted in the law establishing the Bank of Lebanon and its working mechanism and strikes at the core of the principle of independence and unity of the Bank.

 

 

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34. The two main organs of the Bank of Lebanon are the Governor and the Central Council, as stipulated in the second section of the second chapter of the Code of Money and Credit under the title "Organization of the Central Bank." A review of this section related to the organization of the Central Bank reveals that the only two organs entrusted with managing and defining the policy of the Bank and ensuring its integrity are the Governor and his deputies within the Central Council. Consequently, the Banking Control Commission is not one of the regulatory bodies of the Bank of Lebanon, but rather a supervisory department at the Central Bank, completely separate and independent from its other departments (Article 8 of Law No. 28/67).

 

35. The inclusion of the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission among the members composing the Higher Banking Authority is tantamount to a reorganization of the Central Bank and a vertical disruption of its structure. Also, granting and authorizing the Banking Control Commission, through its chairman, to sit as a permanent member in the Higher Authority alongside the Governor and the Central Council (which appoints a deputy to the Governor as a member) is a direct coup against the organization of the Central Bank and its administrative and executive apparatuses. The Banking Control Commission, through its chairman, has been given an administrative and reporting position that rivals the position of the Governor and Deputy Governor, places him on the same level, and bestows upon him a regulatory status and role not granted to him by the legislator and not permissible under administrative law and constitutional law. So how can the chairman of a supervisory body affiliated with the Bank of Lebanon assume an administrative and reporting position parallel to the Governor, play a broader role than his banking supervisory role, and sit in a higher banking authority with a decision-making and adjudicatory role equally? This is a flagrant transgression of the powers and tasks of the Banking Control Commission and its chairman and a challenge to the hierarchy and subordination adopted in the organization of the Central Bank. It is superfluous to say that the Banking Control Commission is part of this organization and is entrusted with supervisory tasks only.

 

36. Returning to the text of Article 148 of the Code of Money and Credit, "Supervision of banks is entrusted to a department in the Central Bank, completely separate and independent from its other departments and directly linked to the Governor." It is therefore understood from this article that the Banking Control Commission is a department of the Central Bank, separate from its other departments, but directly linked to the Governor, and its task is to supervise banks, nothing more. If we review Law 28/67 in its eighth article (8), which states: "An independent committee for the supervision of banks shall be established at the Bank of Lebanon, not subject in the exercise of its functions to the authority of the Bank, and the supervisory department stipulated in Article 148 of the Code of Money and Credit (1963) shall be attached to it," where it was stated in the text of the article itself (Article 8) that the Governor

 

 

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of the Bank of Lebanon to request the committee to conduct a special audit of the situation of a specific bank." This is conclusive proof that the Banking Control Commission is within the structure of the Central Bank and operates in accordance with Article 148 of the 1963 law, and the supervisory department stipulated in Article (148) is attached to it, and it carries out its supervisory tasks over banks independently, but remains directly under the Governor (Article 148). In addition, Article 10 of Law 28/67 stipulated that the Banking Control Commission must inform the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon of the overall and individual situations of banks.

 

37. It should be noted that the Banking Control Commission, according to Article (8) of Law 28/67, is composed of 5 members appointed by a decree issued by the Council of Ministers, and the committee is chaired by a specialist in banking or financial affairs or a university professor specialized in these matters. The Central Bank has no member within this committee, nor does any government department (Directorate of the Ministry of Finance) have a member. Consequently, this committee is a purely technical committee, free from any political subordination, and is only linked to the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon, as mentioned above.

 

38. As for the Higher Banking Authority and the amendments included in the "Reform Draft Law," the violations are numerous, whether from the organizational (Statutaire) or functional (Fonctionnelle) aspects, as we will explain below.

 

39. The Higher Banking Authority is considered part of the core of the Central Bank and the organization enshrined in the Code of Money and Credit, and specifically defined in its fourth chapter under the title "Penalties." Article 209, amended by the law issued on 3/16/1970, states that the penalties stipulated in the preceding article are decided by the Higher Banking Authority established by Article 10 of Law No. 28/67 dated May 9, 1967. This Authority is composed of the following members: the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon as chairman, one of the Deputy Governors chosen by the Central Bank Council, the Director General of Finance, a judge who has practiced law for at least ten years appointed by decree after the approval of the Higher Judicial Council, the member appointed upon the proposal of the Association of Banks in the Supervisory Committee, and the Chairman of the National Deposit Guarantee Institution. Article 10 states that the Supervisory Committee must successively inform the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon of the overall and individual situations of banks, and the Authority has the right to.

 

 

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to request the committee for any additional information on the cases presented to it. This authority replaces the penalties committee stipulated in Article 209 of the Code of Money and Credit and applies, when appropriate, the penalties indicated in Article 208 of the aforementioned law and exercises the powers granted under this law. It is clear from Article 10 of Law No. 28/67, which is currently in force, that the Higher Banking Authority is within the structure of the Bank of Lebanon, and it is entrusted with matters of penalties only, and it is mentioned and listed in Article 208 of the Code of Money and Credit under the title of administrative penalties.

 

40. Article 10 of Law No. 28/67 has limited the tasks of the Higher Banking Authority to deciding the penalties indicated in Article 208 of the Code of Money and Credit. It was also stated in Article 208 that the Central Bank has the right to impose administrative penalties on the offending bank. It is understood from the interconnection of the provisions of the Code of Money and Credit and Law No. 28/67 that the Higher Banking Authority was established to operate within the structure of the Bank of Lebanon and is an integral part of it, as it is the authority entrusted with taking and approving administrative penalties on offending banks, based on the investigations and supervisory actions carried out by the Central Bank through the Banking Control Commission. The Higher Banking Authority, from this perspective, is considered a bound authority (Compétence liée) and strictly limited to administrative penalties on offending banks after the Banking Control Commission verifies the violations committed by the bank under investigation (Article 9 of Law No. 28/67) and in accordance with Article 149 of the Code of Money and Credit, which defines the supervisory procedures to be adopted by the Banking Control Commission.

 

41. This interconnection of provisions between the Code of Money and Credit and Law No. 28/67, which established the Banking Control Commission and the Higher Banking Authority, clearly indicates that the Bank of Lebanon is the first and last regulator of the monetary and banking sector. Accordingly, the system of the Higher Banking Authority and its terms of reference are the Central Bank, headed by the Governor, and nothing else. Consequently, the tasks of the Higher Banking Authority are limited to imposing administrative penalties on offending banks in accordance with Articles 148 and 149 of the Code of Money and Credit.

 

 

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42. What we have clarified above is the positive and current system in force in the banking sector within the application of the laws that govern this sector and are linked to the basic and organic law (Loi organique), i.e., the Code of Money and Credit issued in 1963. We will demonstrate below the extent of (non-) conformity of the "Reform Draft Law" with the articles included and newly introduced therein with the Code of Money and Credit and its subsidiary laws, most importantly Law No. 28/67. We have previously mentioned, when discussing the Banking Control Commission, that the composition of the new Authority adopted in the "Reform Draft Law" constitutes a legal and administrative violation of banking regulation in Lebanon and a violation of the principle of independence and unity of the Central Bank and its operating bodies. Also, the restructuring of the Authority in its entirety is a violation of the principle of independence and unity of banking regulation under the banner of the Central Bank (Indépendance et intégrité des statuts et des fonctions dans le secteur bancaire sous l'autorité de la Banque centrale).

 

43. The amendment to Article 10 of Law No. 28/67, as stated in the "Reform Draft Law," is marred by several violations, the most important of which are two: limiting the independence of the Central Bank, and the direct and veiled political subordination of the Authority. The following is clear from the issue of limiting the independence of the Central Bank, where the violation occurred in the formation of the new Higher Banking Authority from newly created members who are not included in Article 10 currently in force since the approval of Law No. 28/67:

 

- The inclusion of the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission in the Higher Banking Authority is a flagrant violation of the separation of supervision from punishment at the core of the Code of Money and Credit, which distinguished in its six chapters between banking supervision assigned to the Supervisory Committee (Articles 148 and 149) and the administrative punitive authority assigned to the Higher Banking Authority (Articles 208 and 209).

 

- The inclusion of the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission among the members of the Higher Banking Authority is a fundamental challenge to the structure of the Central Bank and a reshuffling of tasks between its administrative, supervisory, and punitive bodies. This strikes at the principle of independence, which must always guide the structure and role of the Central Bank in any organizational or functional amendment to it.

 

 

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- The merging of supervisory tasks and punitive authority within the Higher Banking Authority limits the independence of the Central Bank's work and creates competition between its bodies, i.e., the supervisory body and the punitive body, and marginalizes the role of the Central Council and the Governor, who sponsor this independence.

 

- Article 10, as amended in the "Reform" draft law, excluded judicial reference in the formation of the Authority by excluding a judge appointed by decree after the approval of the Higher Judicial Council. This constitutes another challenge to the principle of independence of the Authority's work as stated in the Code of Money and Credit, as the presence of a judge in the Authority's membership was a guarantee for its work and for the punitive decisions it is authorized to take. The tasks of the committee are not limited only to matters of assessing standards and how to prepare them, but rather they go beyond these expertise to take on a quasi-judicial nature through its decisions that lead to the liquidation of the bank and the distribution of its assets. This is an act that goes beyond administrative penalties to include judicial matters for which the civil courts are competent. Therefore, it is preferable for the membership to include an experienced judge of high rank sitting in the Higher Banking Authority.

 

- New members have been introduced into the Higher Banking Authority, such as legal, financial, and banking experts, who are named and appointed by the competent ministers. This is a flagrant violation of the independence of the Authority and the Central Bank, as the executive authority is not allowed to participate in the composition of the Authority's members, since this Authority must be separate from any direct government political interference. Consequently, the appointment of three experts by the executive authority out of six members who make up the Authority is a direct violation of the independence of the Authority and the Central Bank. Furthermore, in the "Reform Draft Law," the casting vote of the Governor was removed and the decision was adopted by a majority of four members. Consequently, the Authority becomes, directly and indirectly, under the tutelage of the experts named and appointed by the ministers.

 

- It is not permissible for an authority affiliated with the Bank of Lebanon or any independent administrative authority with broad and quasi-judicial powers to include members from the private professional sector and remove members affiliated with public administration and the judiciary, as they are the institutional administrative guarantee for the state.

 

 

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See the general report of the French Council of State for the year 2001, dedicated to independent administrative authorities.

 

Rapport Public 2001 : Les autorités publiques indépendantes

 

Page 312: toutes ces autorités indépendantes ont bien sûr un président qui anime le collège et dirige les services et peut se distinguer des autres membres par son mode de désignation, la durée de son mandat ou l'exercice de certaines prérogatives. Ce président peut être désigné ès qualité, cas du gouverneur de la Banque de France qui préside de droit la Commission bancaire. Ce président fixe l'ordre du jour des réunions et a généralement voix prépondérante en cas de partage des voix.

 

44. Article 3 of the "Reform Draft Law," under the title "Objectives of this Law," stipulated that in applying this law, the following objectives are sought: (1) strengthening the stability of the financial system, (2) ensuring the continuity of essential banking functions, (3) protecting deposits in the liquidation and reform process, (4) limiting the use of public funds in the process of reforming the situation of banks. After this article defined the objectives of the "Reform Draft Law" in its Article 3, its Article 5 amended Article 10 of Law No. 28/67 regarding the formation of the Higher Banking Authority, and the remaining articles of the "Reform Draft Law" were newly introduced by expanding the powers and tasks of the Authority completely separately from the Central Bank and from the terms of reference of its basic bodies (the Central Council and the Governor).

 

45. In a comparison between Article 3 of the "Reform Draft Law," which defines the objectives of this law as strengthening the stability of the financial system, it becomes clear that this law falls within the structure of banking regulation entrusted to the Bank of Lebanon and within its structure, as the Bank of Lebanon, through the Central Council and its powers granted in the Code of Money and Credit, specifically in Articles 33 and 70 thereof, which we clarify as follows:

 

- Article 33 stipulated that the Council... enjoys the following powers without this enumeration being exclusive: it defines the monetary and credit policy of the Bank (2) it establishes regulations for the application of this law.

 

- Article 70 stated that the mission of the Bank includes, in particular, the following: (1) preserving the integrity of the Lebanese currency (2) preserving economic stability (3) preserving the soundness of the banking system.

 

 

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- The "Reform Draft Law" did not affirm any terms of reference for the Central Bank, nor did it assign it any regulatory or even advisory tasks in the process of وضع المصارف (bank resolution) and their restructuring.

 

- The "Reform Draft Law" comes isolated from the Central Bank and its basic bodies, i.e., the Central Council and the Governor, knowing that the tasks of defining, drawing up, and applying monetary and financial policy belong to it and to it exclusively, as can be inferred from the Code of Money and Credit.

 

46. The Governor of the Bank of Lebanon and the Central Council have the powers to oversee and maintain the application of monetary policy and the stability of the financial system in the country. As for the "Reform Draft Law," it has installed the Higher Banking Authority in the position of the supreme body of the Central Bank, ignoring the role and tasks of the Central Council and the Governor as follows:

 

- From a banking authority entrusted with implementing administrative penalties, the Higher Banking Authority has become the authority that draws up and strengthens the stability of the financial system and carries out broad tasks of assessment, evaluation, and approval of bank liquidation without any administrative or judicial terms of reference.

 

- From a bound authority (Compétence liée) in implementing the administrative penalties specified in Article 208, the Higher Banking Authority has become a discretionary authority (Pouvoir discrétionnaire) in deciding the fate of banks, placing them under reform, and carrying out the liquidation process.

 

- This discretionary and decision-making authority was never granted to any authority or committee affiliated with the Bank of Lebanon outside its basic bodies, i.e., the Central Council and the Governor.

 

47. Law No. 28/67, which established the Banking Control Commission and the Higher Banking Authority, clearly defined the tasks of each of these two bodies affiliated with the Central Bank. The Banking Control Commission was assigned the tasks of periodic supervision of banks in accordance with Articles 148 and 149 of the Code of Money and Credit, and this supervision remains linked to the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon. As for the Higher Banking Authority, its tasks were limited to imposing the administrative penalties stipulated in Article 208 of the Code of Money and Credit on banks.

 

 

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48. Law No. 28/67 granted the Higher Banking Authority the right to approve the receivership of distressed banks for a limited period of one year from the date of its establishment, not to exceed the end of 1968 (Article 23 of Law No. 28/67). Provisions and arrangements for receivership were placed under the supervision of the Special Banking Court (Article 30 of Law No. 28/67). It can be inferred from what we have stated that the Higher Banking Authority (before the Reform Draft Law) is:

 

- An administrative body with limited authority to decide on the administrative penalties specified in Article 148 of the Code of Money and Credit.

 

- It has the authority of receivership over distressed banks for a specific period, with a maximum deadline of 12/31/1968. This authority is placed under the supervision of the judicial authority, i.e., the Special Banking Court, as the decision of receivership leading to a type of liquidation of the bank is a judicial decision that requires adherence to judicial rules and principles, and consequently entails the separation of administrative authorities from judicial ones.

 

- The Higher Banking Authority must consider the cases presented to it and referred to it by the Banking Control Commission, which in turn (i.e., the Banking Control Commission) must successively inform the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon of the overall and individual situations of banks (Article 10 of Law 28/67).

 

- It is clear that both the Committee and the Authority have separate, defined, and interconnected tasks under the governance of the Bank of Lebanon.

 

 

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49. As for the "Reform Draft Law," it came to abolish this entire banking regulation, under the pretext of strengthening the financial stability system:

 

- It marginalized the role of the Central Council and the Governor, as they no longer have any terms of reference, neither over the Supervisory Committee nor over the expanded activities assigned to the Higher Banking Authority.

 

- It expanded the powers of the Higher Banking Authority to become discretionary powers, and it was given discretionary authority even over the work of the Banking Control Commission, which now submits its recommendations to the Authority only, and the latter has the right not to adopt those recommendations.

 

- It granted the Higher Banking Authority the sole authority to decide and report on the liquidation of banks, and it has full authority in matters of assessment, appointment of liquidators and temporary managers, defining their tasks, and dismissing them, without any prior judicial oversight and without any regard for the right of defense of the bank designated for liquidation or any respect for the principle of due process that must be respected when administrative penalties exceed their disciplinary (Disciplinaire) limits to become quasi-judicial provisions.

 

50. For all these reasons, the "Reform Draft Law" is unconstitutional, as it violates the principle of independence of the Bank of Lebanon from its organizational and functional aspects, affects the unity of its regulations and provisions, and exposes monetary and banking policy to danger and government interference.

 

51. Also, the "Reform Draft Law" did not respect the principle of separation of powers, as it granted the Higher Banking Authority decision-making and discretionary powers in determining penalties for banks, and specifically in defining and regulating liquidation matters without any prior judicial oversight or any right of defense for the banks designated for liquidation.

 

52. The powers granted to the Higher Banking Authority did not include any legal or judicial controls for the new tasks assigned to it.

 

 

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53. It is well-established in law and constitutional jurisprudence that any administrative authority possessing the right to impose extensive administrative penalties must be protected by the legislator with controls and immunities that guarantee the principle of the right of defense and due process (Droit de la défense et principe du contradictoire) towards the penalized individuals.

 

Reference: Decision of the French Constitutional Council dated January 17, 1989: No penalty may be imposed on a licensed person without enabling the latter to present his observations on the acts attributed to him, as well as the possibility for the latter to access his specific file.

 

See also the decisions of the French Constitutional Council:

 

DC No. 84-173 du 26 juillet 1984

 

,DC No. 86-217 du 18 septembre 1986

 

See also the report of the French Council of State dated December 8, 1994

 

"Les pouvoirs de l'administration dans le domaine des sanctions"

 

54. The "Reform Draft Law" did not provide for any legal mechanism or principles to guarantee the right of the bank designated for liquidation to defend itself, access its file during investigations, and express its opinion on the assessment processes and temporary administration carried out against it. This is a flagrant violation of constitutional principles.

 

55. The "Reform Draft Law" did not consider whether the Higher Banking Authority, in its new form, is exceptional and has exceptional tasks limited in scope and time. The silence applied by the "Reform Draft Law" in this regard suggests that this Higher Banking Authority, originally affiliated with the structure of the Bank of Lebanon, has become a rogue entity outside the banking and financial fold codified in the Code of Money and Credit, to become an autonomous authority that rivals and overturns the authority of the Bank of Lebanon.

 

56. Marginalizing the role of the Bank of Lebanon and its basic bodies in preparing and issuing draft laws that are unrestrained by any banking and financial regulation and free from any administrative and judicial controls endangers the financial stability and monetary policy entrusted to the Bank of Lebanon, headed by the Central Council and the Governor.

 

 

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57. One of the most important features of sound legislation is its readability (Lisibilité). This is a need for those concerned, for official bodies, for judges, and for lawyers. Unreadable legislation is not amenable to sound interpretation and application, and becomes a source of disputes and lawsuits. Even if the various texts relating to a single subject are not collected in a single text (and this is the case, as we saw above, with regard to the Code of Money and Credit and subsequent banking laws), these laws remain readable if they are homogeneous, without contradiction between them, and without repetition and duplication. This is what the Lebanese legislator has been keen on since 1963, as each new law came in harmony with the previous texts, based on a single foundation, and directed towards a single goal (which is to give the Bank of Lebanon what is necessary to complete its tasks stipulated in Article 70), and each new body was independent of the previous bodies without overlap between them. As for the "Reform Draft Law," it came very far from all of that. Besides its explanatory memorandum being declarative, unscientific, and brief (half a page) in a way that does not correspond to a text of this size, this importance, and this technical complexity (for comparison, the explanatory memorandum of the draft Code of Money and Credit is 34 pages long), the text of the "Reform Draft Law" was full of errors. We give one example of this: in the table of contents, the title of the second chapter is "The Higher Banking Authority for Reforming the Situation of Banks," while in the body of the text, the title is "The Authority Competent to Reform the Situation of Banks." In addition, the first article of this second chapter, which is Article 10, became unreadable after being amended repeatedly from one draft to another in the days and hours preceding the approval of the draft law. It is not understood why Article 10 begins by amending the first and last sections of Article 10 of Law No. 28/67 regarding the members of the Higher Banking Authority, while the second chapter is concerned with the authority competent to reform the situation of banks. The opening paragraph of this Article 10, which stated that the competent authority is the Higher Authority, was deleted in one of the drafts.

 

58. As for the content of the "Reform Draft Law," its provisions have deprived banking legislation of all homogeneity. If the objective behind this project was to establish a mechanism and bodies concerned with reforming the situation of banks and their restructuring (following the systemic crisis to which the Lebanese financial and banking sector was exposed) separate from the Bank of Lebanon and from the current banking legislative system (which only simulated the individual failure of a specific bank), then it would have been better to enact a completely separate law from existing laws, including new bodies unrelated to existing bodies. Even this would not have been correct unless a period was specified for the application of this law, ending, for example, with the end of the process of reforming and restructuring the banking sector, so that this law would be exceptional and limited to resolving the banking crisis.

 

 

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arising from the financial crisis, and after the crisis is resolved, the previous texts would apply and the newly created bodies in the draft law would be dissolved. This is what the drafters of the draft law did not do: the "Reform Draft Law" mixed new bodies with previously existing ones, and changed the name and/or composition and/or tasks of the latter, without it being understood whether the new bodies replaced the existing ones only for the needs of applying the "Reform Draft Law" or also in their current tasks governed by the laws in force for half a century.

 

59. The draft "Reform Draft Law" dated April 4, 2025, included Article (38) which regulates (in a completely unclear manner) "the extent of application of other laws and regulations," and stipulates that this law applies exclusively in the cases and situations mentioned in its provisions, and its provisions replace the provisions of any laws or other regulations that conflict with its content, such as the Commercial Code, the Code of Money and Credit for Laws No. 2/67 and 28/67, and Law No. 110 of 1991, and others. This Article (38), with all its flaws (how can the new law replace previous laws, and at the same time use bodies established and regulated in previous laws?), was deleted from the final draft dated April 12, 2025, which was approved by the Council of Ministers.

 

60. Furthermore, the "Reform Draft Law" included a provision in its Article 23 stating that the provisions of Chapter 9 of this law apply exclusively to the liquidation process and replace any laws and other regulations that conflict with its content. Consequently, the "Reform Draft Law" has further fragmented the laws regulating the Bank of Lebanon and guaranteeing its independence. It is clear from this article that it specified that the ninth chapter of the "Reform Draft Law" related to the liquidation process replaces any laws and other regulations that conflict with its content, but it did not, in return, specify any legal precedence for the rest of its articles and chapters, despite their conflict with the laws regulating the Bank of Lebanon and other commercial laws that are directly related to the texts of this project, especially, for example, Article 16 of its fifth chapter, which defines and expands the powers of the Higher Banking Authority, which has become solely concerned with the process of reforming the situation of banks in isolation from the Bank of Lebanon, which originally did not have those powers. Did this Authority replace the Bank of Lebanon with new powers? Or did it remain under its supervision and regulations from a purely illusory perspective? Is it not more appropriate and preferable to grant this

 

 

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reform powers to the Bank of Lebanon, to be subsequently channeled through it to its affiliated bodies and departments?

 

61. In the absence of a serious explanatory memorandum for the "Reform Draft Law," it is not understood how the provisions of the deleted Article 38 would have been applied, nor is it understood how the "Reform Draft Law" will now be applied in the absence of a similar article that establishes a link between the old laws and the new law. What is the reason, for example, for the confusion between the "competent authority" and the "Higher Banking Authority"? Is the latter still existing within the framework of Law No. 28/67, or has it become existing only within the framework of the "Reform Draft Law"? In the first case, does the method of its formation noted in the "Reform Draft Law," resulting from the amendment of Article 10 of Law No. 28/67, also apply within the framework of the previous laws, or only within the framework of the "Reform Draft Law"? The same questions arise with regard to the "Special Court" established by Law No. 110 issued on 11/7/1991 concerning "Reforming the Banking Situation" (Article 15) and adopted by the "Reform Draft Law" (in Article 29).

 

We hope that this study has shed light on the extent and importance of the independence of the Bank of Lebanon to fortify its role and basic tasks in preserving the integrity of the Lebanese currency, economic stability, the soundness of the banking system, and developing the monetary and financial market (Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit). It has also shed light on the extent and importance of the principle of homogeneity of banking legislation, which the legislator has maintained, despite all difficulties, for 62 years (since the issuance of the Code of Money and Credit in 1963).

 

We also hope that this study has shown how the draft law related to "Reforming the Situation of Banks in Lebanon and Their Restructuring" in its current form, which was approved by the Council of Ministers on April 12, 2025, directly affects the two basic principles upon which the Bank of Lebanon and the entire banking sector were built: the independence of the Bank of Lebanon and the homogeneity of banking legislation.

 

 

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